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1 INTRODUCTION 
The era of globalisation has brought sweeping change to the workplace. 
Transfers, mergers, outsourcing and an erosion of employment security 
have been among the consequences. In a country with an inadequate 
social security network, such as South Africa, many employees are cru~ 
dally dependent on employment-related benefits such as retirement funds 
and medical aid. If they lose their Jobs, they lose their benefits as well. 
This article deals with some of the Implications, from an employee's 
point of view, of the transfer of the transfer of a business. The Labour 
Relations Act," following European precedent,; provides for [he transfer of 
employees' contractual and other employment rights from the old to the 
new employer if a business is transferred as a "going concern". In addi· 
lion, the Constitution 4 provides for the horizontal application of funda~ 
mental rights,~ thus creating scope for the enforcement of socio~economic 
rights as between employer and employee Employment benefits, it will 
be argued, fall into this category. 
Particular attention is given to retirement benefits, for which special 
provision is made in European as well as South African legislation. The 
article also surveys the law applicable to the transfer of enterprises in 
other Southern African countries.' 
2 THE CASE OF MRS X 
Let us take an imaginary case stUdy. Mrs X, a single parent. has worked as 
a cleaner at a university for 15 years. Along with her modest salary she 
1 j dtll indebted 10 DaWlr Hurling for rt;~edrcJr assistallce in (he prepilr<1(iorr uf llris paper. 
2 Au b6 ot 1995; ret"erred 10 as the LHA uc!uw: sec ss I g7 -- ! g7B 
'3 j)irectiVl' 77/1 87/EEt. subsequently replan~d by Directive 2001123EC hH discussion of 
Europedll and NOrlh American prt~Cl'c1elr(, st~e Bla{"kif~ & Horwitz "lraflSft~r of Corllrilcts 
ot Employmenr as a result of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Study of Sen ion 197 of (tic 
Labour Kdauo[1s Act 66 at 1995" (1999) 20 1l./1387 dt 1390-llg1-
1- ConstilllljO[1 of the Ht~Pllblic of Sourh Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
5 S 8(2), Conslitution: set~ HS 90 below 
b Set: Appendix A_ for lhis, tire research carried out try Ann!' Sclwithaller during tile first 
pan of" 2002 IS graret"ully acknowledged 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
has enjoyed fairly generous medical aid and pension benefits as well as 
the right to a 75% discount on tuition fees for her children,' These bene-
fits are important to her because her son needs chronic medication and 
her daughter has started studying law. Then, one day, the university 
announces that it is planning to outsource its cleaning service to a private 
company. In order to concentrate on its core business of providing quality 
education, it explains, operating costs in non-core areas must be reduced. 
The good news is that cleaning staff will be offered jobs by the new com-
pany. The bad news is that they will lose most of their benefits. 
The common law offers them no protection. In Roman-Dutch law, trans-
fer of a business terminates existing employment contracts and the new 
employer may elect whether or not to offer re-employment to the em-
ployees. If so, it may be on different terms and conditions.1l 
Mrs X and her colleagues, being unable to afford legal fees, turn to their 
trade union for advice. The union's legal officer will be able to offer them 
some hope. If a business or service or any p<Ht of it is transferred as a 
"going concern", section 197 of the LRA provides inter alia that: 
(a) the new employer is automatically substituted for the old employer in 
respect of all contracts of employment in existence immediately be-
fore the date of transfer, and 
(b) all the rights and obligations between the old employer and its em-
ployees at the time of the transfer continue in force as if they had been 
rights and obligations between the new employer and the employees. 9 
However, this protection only applies if the transaction falls within the 
ambit of a "transfer" as contemplated in section 197. And looking at 
recent court decisions, the union legal officer would have to add, it is 
uncertain whether an outsourcing transaction will, in fact, be regarded as 
a "transfer" of "part of a business".'o 
Mrs X and her colleagues are likely to be anxious and indignant. What is 
[he good of section 197, they may ask, if it allows outsourcing operations 
to happen regardless of the effect on employees? 
7 A :,iwablf' uoJy of case law has developed around alleged ullfilirness by empluyers if! 
Iht! provisiorl ur lwndits to employees, by which the COrHerH of sllch rights as well as 
rhe rules reldling to rheir enforcement are tllustrated See Schoeman &. Anorher v Sam-
slmg Llectrunics SI\ (Pty) Ltd [1997] 10 t3LlH I 364 (LC), Gay/ani v Telkom South Africa 
Ltd [199~1 9 BI.I.R 942 (lO; Northern Cape Provincial AdministratIOn v lIambidge NO 6: 
others [1999] 7 BLLR 698 (LC); Heyn.~·en v Arms/rong Hydraulics (Pty) Ud [2000] 12 BLLR 
1111 (1.("); Fredl--'nCRS &. Others v MF.C Responsihle/or EdllC(//!On & Traininy in the Eastern 
Cape Province 6: O/has [200 I J j 1 BlLH 126!) (Ck), DII Toil "The difference between 
·bendtt" and 'remuneration'" I.abour Law News and CCMA Reports (May 2UOO) 
1:\ Sec POOdgTO (A division of l.eisurent'{ Ltd) v Heil [19991 Y 8LLR 875 (LAC) at 879. The 
po:-,itlon ill Engli:-,It law i:-, :-,ilTlilar: "The purct1a.st!r wa:-, Ilnder [10 obligation to otrer re-
emplllYlllent 10 ttlC employees. The chOICe of employee:, tlO{ to cOIHinl!e employmenl 
with a new employer was said to be "the main rlitfercilce between a servant and a serf" 
(per I.uni Atkin:-, i[1 Nokes v lJonc({s{er Amalgamated Collit'ries Ltd [1910J 3 All ER 519 (Ill» 
I) S 197(2) In tilt: remainder of this artiLie. the term 'protected trdn~fer" i:-, used (0 
(](>:-,("ribed tile transfcr of a business SlllJjecl In s 197 
J (] SeE'. in particular, Nehawll v University of Cape Town [2002] 4 lH.I.H 3 J J (LAC): discussed 
at 102 ·103 below. 
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THE TRANSFER OF IONTE;RPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Faced with this hard question, the trade union legal officer might re-
member section 3 of the l.RA, stating that [he Act must be interpreted "in 
compliance with the Constitution". The Constitution guarantees "every-
one" the right not only to fair labour practices, but also the right of access 
to health care, social security and education. It also places certain obliga-
tions on the staLe lO give effect to these rights by means or legislation. 11 
No less importantly, the Constitution states that the above provisions bind 
not only the state, but natural and juristic persons as well, "if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and 
the nature of any duty imposed by the right"." 
All these rights, however, are subject to limitation by "laws of general 
application" within the parameters of reasonableness and justifiability 
permitted by the Constitution's own "!imitation clause".'~ The LRA is a law 
of general application. A number of questions therefore arise; 
• Do employment benerits, such as those enjoyed by Mrs X and her 
colleagues, fall within the ambit of those rights which sections 27 and 
29 of the Constitution are seeking to protect? Can the duty to preserve 
such benefits in principle be enforceable against jurislic persons such 
as the university and the cleaning company? 
• If so, how should section 197 of the I.RA, as a statutory provision 
potentially limiting employees' continued enjoyment of the rights in 
question, be interpreted? 
• And if section 197 does permit the extinction of those rights, is it 
conslitutiona I? 
These questions are examined in the remainder of the article. 
3 THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
Though the Constitution itself does not use the term, the following basic 
rights have been described as "socio~economic rights": ,4 
• the righ[ [Q an environment that is nor harmful to health or well~being 
(s 24): 
• the right of access to adequate housing (s 26( I »; 
• the right of access to; 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
(b) sufficient food and water: and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves 
and their dependants, appropriate social assistance (s 27(1»: 
II See ss 27 dnd 29(1) ot (he ("on~tllLltion 
12 S H(2). C:ofl:.tillllioll 
13 S 36, Constitution, see nOle 15 below. 
11 See OliVier OkPdlubCl Smit & Thornp~on (cds) Social Secunlj Law. general principles 
p.'Jlt(~rwt)nhs 1999 517· 520, Llebenbcrg "Soulll AtriC<I's evolving Jurisprudence on ~o(io­
economic rights. An efteclive 1001 in challenging fJovenyT' 20()2(2) I./J/J I ~9 at 162· 1 M. 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
the right to: 
(a) a basic education, including adult basic education; and 
(b) runher education, which the state, through reasonable measures, 
must make progressively available and accessible (s 29(1)); and 
children's rights (s 28( I)) 
Importantly, the duty placed on the state to give etfect to the rights pro-
vided for in sections 26 and 27 (above) at any point in time is limited to 
that which is permitted by its "available resources". Similarly, the duty to 
provide further education is limited to "reasonable measures". Only the 
rights of children, set out in section 28, are unqualified. It follows that the 
corresponding rights of citizens are limi(ed to the same ex(ent.l~ 
Section 8(2) of the Constitution, as noted already, explicitly provides ror 
the horizontal application of basic rights "if, and to the extent that, [they 
are] applicable. taking into account the nature of the right and the nature 
of any duty imposed by the right". Section 8(3) states that. when applying 
a provision or the Bill or Rights to a natural or juristic person, a court 
"must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law (Q the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to that fight",'" but "may develop rules of 
(he common law to limi( the right, provided that the limita(ion is in accor~ 
dance with section 36(1)" (emphasis added)." 
Some commentators argue that socio-economic rights are not "applica~ 
ble" for purposes or section 8(2).11'1 On the one hand i( is suggested that 
section 8(2) merely permits the horizontal application of basic rights and. 
IS Scc S(Jo/mmwney v Minister (if Health, Kwalu/u Natal 119971 12 BClH 1696 (CO: (;(Jvem-
ment o/rhe' Repuhlu: a/South A/ncri v [;rootboom & orht-'rs [2000J II IKLH 1 169 (Ce) 
16 for an application of the prilKiple in relarion 10 Lile LRA's prohibition of unfair labour 
pracllces and rile law ot deHu, see Walters v TranSltJOna{ Local CounCl! of Port elizabeth 
and anorher [20011 I BI.l.R 98 (l.C). For uJJlsideratioli of Lhe effeu of thc mnstilulional 
right ro PrlVdty In [he conlexr of discipllllary procccdlflgs by a pnvale employer. see In-
tt.'r afw J'rotea Technofoyy Ltd v Wainer 1997 (9) BelR 1225 (W): AII!t'd Workers Union oj 
SA obo NC/lIlt' v Northern Crimr-' Security CC (1999) 20 ILJ 1954 (CCMA) and Sugref'n v 
S((mdard BaTIk of SA [2002] 7 BAI,R 769 (e(MA). See also Goosen v Caroline's frozen Yo-
yhurt Parlow (pry) Ud and another I j 995] 2 BLLR 6S (I C) and George v Liberty Lffe Asso-
ciarion I?f Afri('a Ud [19%1 8 BLLR 98S (10 (decided iii terlllS of (he in(erim 
COIlS(iIU(ion). 
17 S 36( I ) rCdds dS follows 
"Tile rights in (lie Bill of Rights lTlay be limited oilly in [ernlS of law of general applica-
tion [0 rile eXlel)[ tlldL tlie lirnildlion is rcasonable and jusliridhle ill an open and demo-
cratic socielY bJsed on hUlllan dignity, equaliLY and freedom. [aklrlg inlo dCCOllT1l all 
relcvaJII fi-lctors, including -
(a) Ihe ndllJn~ of rhe righl: 
(b) (11(;' inlportance of Ihe purpose of Lhe IUllltation; 
(e) the naturc amI extent or Ihe liJ\1Il<1(ion: 
(d) Ihe rela(ion belwcen lhe limitarion and its pllrpose; dnd 
(e) Jess reslriltlve means In achievt~ Ihe purpose" 
18 'Private person' or 'prlvate actor' in Ihe dlSCUSSIOIl lhat follows includes the SIdle in irs 
capilCity as f'mpluyer and olher ernployers in Ihe plJhlie seClor; t'g, local government. 
The reason is that the rela(jonsilip belween tlte staLe and its employees IS a privale Ulle: 
tllal IS, Ihe rig Ius and dUlie::. beL ween them are limited In Ilwir particular rclatlonship 
and do nOI eXlend to members of the pubiC aL large 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEF[TS 
accordingly, "leaves entirely to the couns the determinmion of when, if 
ever, horizontal application would be appropriate". ", Cheadle and Davis 
imerpret the term "applicable" as meaning not only whether a ri.~ht is 
"capable" of horizontal application but also whether is "suitable" to be so 
applied.~'l The socio-economic rights provided for in sections 26 and 27 of 
the Constitution, the authors believe, are not "applicable" in this sense, 
"Given the potentially onerous nature of such a duty on private persons", 
they conclude, "the likely outcome of the analysis must be that these 
rights are not suitable for horizontal application."JI 
But there is also a counter-argument. Jnternationallaw, it is poimed out, 
"has increasingly emphasised that non-state actors have obl!,sations 
regarding the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights","- From 
this standpoim "the argument that socjo~economjc rights are generally 
incapable of horizomal application is wrong in principle. Each right must 
be assessed on its own in the light of the duties it embodies to determine 
whether it has horizontal reach".?> Similarly, De Vos states that it is "im~ 
pOSSIble to make a blanket statement about the instances in which the 
social and economic rights will, or will not, apply to juristic persons or 
private individuals" and that each obligation must be considered on its 
merits.:' 1 
If this is correct, the inquiry becomes two-fold. The first question is 
whether the right is capable or, as Cheadle and Davis put it, "suitable for 
application" Socio-economic rights are not uniform in terms of their cost. 
The fact that certain socio-econom ic rights may be unsuitable for horizon-
tal application as between particular parties does not mean that all socio~ 
economic rights are unsuitable as between all parties. 
This seemingly practical question, however, cannot be separated from 
the underlying legal question as to the relationship between the parties. A 
private person, unlike the state, clearly cannot be held liable to give effect 
to the socio-economic rights of other private persons in general. Some 
19 Sprigrlli:l.fl & OsUome "'f)u Plessis is not dead' Suuth Africd's 1996 Constitution and the 
clpplication of (he Hill of Higllts (0 privale disputes" (I (99) J'1 SAJHU 2'1 a( 31 
20 Cheadle & Davis "The applict:ltlon ot the 1996 ConstillJtion in Ihe private splwre" (1997) 
13 SAjl-IR 44 al 57 5S, See also Sprigman C<. Osuorne op eil al 35 36. 
2 J Cheadle & Davls al bU, 
22 ltllrwa Ublig()[lOns of non-stale actors m relalion to economIc, soclill and cultural righls 
llnilter rhe S(Jurh Ajnc(fn C(Jnstirwwn CmlHTllHlily Law Centre, IJniversily of Ihe W(!sICrrI 
Cape. dOU2 2 I. with ret"erence Inter alia to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
lhe At'ricclH Charl(~r 011 Humafl clnd Peoples' l{igl1ts, the IllIernallonal Covenam on Eco" 
rlOlllie, Social and Cul(IJral Rights, [he Tripdrtitc J)eclaration or Principles COflCcrning 
Mullitli:HicHidl Enllerprises and SOCIal Policy 01' the Jmernalional Labour OrgaJlisalion 
OLO) To Ihe eXlelll Ihat tlleSe instruments are not legally binding, it is suggested, rhey 
may nevenheJess "constitute evidence or all emerging customary rule that priVdte actors 
have direct obligatiolts engcfl(iered by eUJrl()Jnic, social dnd ClIhlJrdl rigllls'" op Cit 9. 
21 Ibid 2 (. See aiso J)t~ Vas "Pious wishes or directly enforceable human rights? Social and 
economic rights in South Atrica's [996 Constillllion" (1997) 13 SAJHH 67 dt 70; In rt: 
Certification oJ the Conslirurion oj the USA 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC): J 996 I U BU.K. 12.":11 
(CC) J 286 
24 De Vos "i-'ious wislles or (iireCily etlt'orcealJle human rights? Social and eCO[l()JIHC nghts 
In South Atrica's I 99b ConSlitutiOJl" (1997) 1'3 SAjllR b 7 at J 00 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
prior legal nexus, such as that created by a contract of employment, must 
exist in terms of which one party can be held liable to meet the other's 
claim. 25 And if this is so, it would seem to dispose of the question of 
"suitability": if one party is (say) contractually bound to provide a particu· 
lar service or benefit to the other, it can hardly be considered "unsuitable" 
or "inapplicable". 
But does this not, by the same token, render the issue of horizontality 
irrelevant? If a benefit is due in terms of an existing legal duty, does the 
question of a constitutional right of access to that benefit not fall away? 
The answer, it is submitted, is 'no'. This becomes clear in a situation 
where - as in the case study above - the existing duty is terminated. The 
common law presents no obstacle to this. The question is whether the 
Constitution, and section 197 interpreted in compliance with the Constitu~ 
tion, will permit the corresponding right to be extinguished," 
The starting point is that the Constitution, and laws in general, must be 
interpreted purposively rather than formally, The preamble to the Consti· 
tutlon describes the purpose of the Constitution as, inter alia, "[improving] 
the quality of life of all citizens and [freeingl the potential of each person". 
Socio~economic rights should be seen as a means towards this end. It 
follows that statutory rights relevant to this constitutional objective - such 
as, in the present context, section 197 - should be interpreted in such a 
way as to further it, rather than limit it." It also follows that any limita· 
tions on such rights must be interpreted restrictively. In weighing up the 
parties' statutory rights in such a context, thus, the court will not be at 
large to exercise its discretion solely with reference to the prima facie 
meaning of the statute, but is bound to give due weight to any constitu~ 
tionally-protected right the claimant is found to have. 
Applying these principles to the case of Mrs X, it will be seen that the 
substance of several of the socio~economic rights entrenched in the Con-
stititution are at issue - in particular, her right to social security in the 
form of pension rights, her daughter's right to further education and her 
son's right of access to medical care. In terms of the contract between Mrs 
X and her current employer, she is entitled to employment benefits 
corresponding to the above~mentioned socio~economic rights. There is 
also a potential nexus between Mrs X and the cleaning company in the 
25 It [his is at cepled. it would dispose of some of' the more extreme inr~rpre[a[JOns Ihil.t 
rnay be pldced on the rlotion of horizontaJity: see, eg, Cockrell "Private Law and the Bill 
of ['{ights" A Threshold Issue of 'HorizonraJity'" Bill of Righrs Compendium Issue [I But-
lerwonhs June 2002 3A t 3. 
26 Ilad s [<)7 liar been on the statute book, [he question might tldve been whether tile 
cornman law should be applied. or developed, in order (0 give effect ro lile affe{ red 
rights: see s Sn). Constitution. 
27 "When lIHerprering any legislation. and when developing tile common law or CUSlolll-
ary law, every coun, tribunal or t'orulrl mUST pronlore the spirit. purport and objects 01 
tile ~ill 01 Highls'" s 39(2), Constirution. Likewis(~, COrrlmon law rules must be inter-
preted witl! cl vit:w to giving effecr 10 the underlying collsritu[il}fldl rigtH, subject only to 
tile degree ut' limitation perlTli!!ed by the lirnitatiofl clause s 8(3), Constirution; and see 
Cockrell op cir par 3A10 
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TI-IE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFlTS 
form of section 197 of the LRA, which may oblige the latter to assume 
responsibility for providing those benefits. If the above analysis is correct, 
these contractual and statutory rights may be seen as a vehicle for giving 
effect to objectives that sections 27 and 29 of the COnS(itUlion are seeking 
to achieve. This should have an important bearing on the interpretation of 
section 197 as a means of protecting or permitting the extinction of those 
rights, 
4 SOCIO·ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT 
The above instance of the de facto provision of socio-economic benefits by 
an employer to an employee is not an isolated one. In fact. (here is a 
pervasive connection between employment and access to a wide range of 
benefits corresponding to those envisaged by the Constitution. 
In terms of the Unemployment Insurance Act," for example, employers 
and employees contribute jointly to the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
from which employees or former employees may claim unemployment, 
illness, maternity and other benefits.~q Similarly, [he Compensation I"or 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act") requires an employer to pay an 
assessed amount into a s(d(Utory compensation fund in respect of its 
employees, thereby entitling (he latter to claim benefits in respecr of 
injuries or diseases suffered as a result of their employment. The effect is 
to compel an employer (or employer and employee jOintly) to satisfy 
employees' right of access to social security to a greater or lesser extent. 
Claims for socio-economic benefits against private parties are concur-
rent With, and not additional to, statutory claims. Thus a pension from a 
private fund, typically included in an employment package, disqualifies an 
employee from claiming a social pension, or "grant",'] or reduces it by the 
amount of the private pension.': To this extent, in other words, the right 
to social security contained in section 27( I) of the Constitution. and 
implemented by the Social Assistance Act, may equally be satisfied by a 
private provider, [hereby absolVing [he state from further responSibility to 
do so." 
If this approach is correct, the definitive question is nO( who provides 
the benefit, but whether its content (whatever the legal basis for its provi-
sion) corresponds to that envisaged by the Constitution. If so, it would 
2t! A( I (J3 of 200 I (replacing Act 30 of 1966) read With lhe UnemploYlnent Insurance 
CO!llnbuuQns All 4 of 2002 CUIA·J. 
29 Ie. adop[ion benefit.':> and depemlatlts' IJCIlCfits: see s 12 redd wllh Parts I: ami r 01 lIlt' 
ALl 
30 Act J 3U of [993 ('COIDA') 
31 110 (he SOCIal ASSIstance Acr S9 of 1992, as anlcJlded by (1[(: Welldrc l.dWS Arrwndllwill 
An 106 of [ 997 
32 For discussion at· some ot" the qU('s(ioJls (hiS gives rise 10, sec Olivier lOt (1/ up ci! 108, 
1[0 
33 SllTlilarly. In (erlllS ot s 78 ot CO!DA, medical aid provided by (he employer can lake (he 
place of medIcal aid prOVided in renns at the Acl, to thaI CXICfl( relieving Ihe clllployer 
of Its statutory obhgations 
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LAW. DEMOCHACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
follow that the value of privately-provided benefits should be no less than 
that of the corresponding statutory benefits, which may be deemed to 
give effect to the constitu(ional mandate. In practice, however, medical 
aid, penSion and other benefits available to an employee are often supe-
rior to (he equivalent stare benefirs. 34 Can it be argued that (he level of 
statutory bendits defines the extent of the right in question? And if so, are 
benefits provided to employees over and above this level purely contrac-
tual, divorced from the status of socio-economic rights and falling beyond 
the ambit of the constitutional guarantee? If this is so, Mrs X could not rely 
in any way on sections 27 and 29 of the Constitution. 
On the other hand it may be argued that sections 27 and 29 of the Con-
stitution do not limit the rights in question The rights themselves are 
unqualified; all that is limited is the extent to which the state is liable to 
give effect to them at any point in time. In this regard section 27(2) pro-
vides as follows: 
The slale mUSl take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its avail-
able resources, LO achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights 
On a purposive reading, section 27(2) recognises that steps taken by the 
Slate may not necessarily be adequate to "realise" the rights in question 
when measured. for example, againsr the vision contained in {he pream~ 
ble to the Constitution. By no stretch of the imagination can the modest 
levels of social grams, public education, health care and other measures 
taken by the state "within its available resources" be equated to those of a 
society based on "social justice", able to "free the potential of each per-
son", It is. indeed, debatable whether the levels of private~sector benefits 
available to the majority of employees approximate this standard. 
An appropriate test for establishing the constitutional protection of pri-
vale socio~economic benefi(s over and above the SlatUwry levels, it is 
submitted, can be inferred from the limltalion clause." The denial of such 
protection can only be read into the relevant statutes to the extent that 
such exclusion is "reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom .. • .. On this basis it 
would be more accurate to say lhat the "private" benefits available lo 
many employees may place them (and often thelf families) in the rela-
lively fortunate position of having achieved lhe realisalion of their socio~ 
economic rights to a greater extent than those who are unemployed. It 
does not necessarily imply that the benefits they enjoy are protected any 
less than the statutory benefits." 
14 :)uobrmn()m'y (flote 15 allOVC) is a case in point. H<ld Mr Soobrallloney been a rnPllltwr 
of it medical aid ~d\(,lTle, ht! lI\ety well have beel) efllilled to Ihe Hearrnent which he 
tfled lHlsllcce;.,~hllJy to claim frolll the stale 
35 See llOle 17 above. 
16 Fg, I/l(' Iwrks t'tljoyt-:d by hi~hly-paid corpora It! t!xecutives may exceed the level ot' 
access to so(io-eConoullt.. rights contPlllpl<lteti by the COllslilUliof) ilnd [0 [hat (~xtellt letll 
Lwyund tlte scope of constilU[lorldl proreniofl. 
37 Soc/O-pconOlHrc henefilS proviclecl ill lerms of an t;lllpIOYIIWIH package need !lot be 
liHllled to Ille typical employment benefits. Employee assistance prograllllllP!'> (EAP!'>)' 
eg, Ildve bet-:!I introduced in m,-uty SOlull AfriuHl workpliices Vosloo & Barnard 
/mnrimwri ()n next pagel 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Wherever the boundary is drawn, however, it is submitted that a certain 
core of employment benefits falls squarely within the definition of socio-
economic rights. To the extent that these benefits are contingent on 
employment, protection of employment becomes a necessary aspect of 
the protection of the right in question. But, if a business or part of it is 
transferred, all employment rights and benefits are terminated except to 
the extent that section 197 of the LRA provides for the transfer of those 
rights and benefits to the transferee of the business. 
If this analysis is correct, the construction placed on section 197 will 
determine whether Mrs X's access to socio-economic rights which are 
constitutionally entrenched is extinguished or continues. This, in turn, 
would mean that section 197 should be interpreted in such a way as to 
restrict any limitation of the rights in question; in other words, to include 
the proposed transfer of the cleaning service within the ambit of section 
[97, thereby allowing the rights in question to survive, unless its exclusion 
can be justified in terms of the criteria of constitutional interpretation. 
5 SECTION 197 AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The starting point is that all provisions of the LRA must be interpreted in 
terms of the Constitution. The test is twofold." Section 3 of the LRA states: 
Any person applying this Act must interpret its proviSions -
(a) to give eff"ect to irs primary objects: 
(I)) in compliance With the COnStltutlOn, and 
(C) in compliance with the public international law obltgatlons of the Republtc 
The first leg of the test is to establish whether there is prima/acte conflict 
between section 197 and the constitutional rights contained in sections 
27-29 This is clearly not the case. To the extent that employees' rights 
are enforceable against the "old employer", section 197 on the face of it 
provides for the transfer of those same rights to the -'new employer"" 
and, as such, serves to protect them, There is therefore no need to "read 
down" section J 97 "in compliance with" sections 27-29 as required by 
seclion 3(b) (above) 
The task therefore becomes one of interprettng section 197 in such a 
way as to give effect to the "primary objects" of the Act, included amongst 
which is "to give effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred 
by section 27 of the Uncerimj Constitution".;" The latter section states inter 
"A qlJalllJ(IVe assessment ut the developlllcrH or enlpJoyee aSSI~(drICt: prdctice ill SOlJlh 
Atrica" (2002) SA'/ourna/ I?! Labour Relations vol 26(4)}} [n prirll:iple Ihere ~eell1s to be 
no redson why rigtlls or II1IS llalllrt', to Ihe extent lhal Ihey fall wirhin (he amhit of s 27 
of lhe <- onslilluion. should not {~lljoy similar prot{;t:lio(l 
}t! For d more detailed discussion, see WoolJrey in Dil Toil et 01 l.auour Neiations Law: A 
Comprt'henslvt' Guide <1 ed (Bullerwurlhs 2(03) Ch Jl 
39 The (erm~ "o[d emp[oyer" and "new empluyer", Illough 1l<;e(1 in s J97, are unhelpfu[ in 
thai Ihey bl~g Ille queslinl1 whether the transferee ot a business is IfIdced (he "new ern-
p[nyer" or the employees It would be, 10 ~ay the least. preffldtllre to lise Illi<; term in 11)(' 
contexl o[ a di~PlllC whether or nOl a IranSilCliull is subjc(1 10 ~ 197 
40 Rep[aced by s 2} of Ille final Cnl1s!ilulion (the labour clJuse) 
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LAW, DEMOCRAC---V &. DEVELOPMENT 
alia that "[e]veryone has the right to fair labour practices". This may not 
take the inquiry much further."' To this, however, must be added the 
requirement of section 39(2) of the Constitution that: 
[wJhen imerpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every coure, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights 
Section 197, in other words, must be interpreted in such a way as to 
promote the objectives reflected in the preamble to the Constitution 
(above), as well as the specific objeClives of sections 27-29. To this ex-
tent, it is submitted, it would in principle favour the inclusion of an 
outsourcing transaction within (he ambit of the section if the preservation 
or employees' socio-economic benefits is dependent on such inclusion.';;> 
The proviso "in principle", however, is important. Assuming that sec-
tion 197 itself is constitutional:~ it means that the facts of the transaction 
must bring it within the ambit of section 197. For example, section 197 
applies only to "employees". If Mrs X was in fact an independent contrac-
tor, section 197 could not affect her. Other elements, however. are mat-
ters of judicial interpretation rather than fact. At the heart of the provision 
are the reqUirements that the transaction must amount to (a) the "trans-
fer" of (b) a "business or part of a business" or "service" as (c) a "going 
concern".H The facts of the transaction, in other words, must be capable 
of being construed in conformity with these requirements. 
It is submitted that a transaClion whereby a "service" forming part of 
the university's operations will in future be performed by a different 
person amounts primaJacie to the transfer of part of a business as a going 
concern. I'runaJaCle, therefore, the benefits enjoyed by Mrs X in terms of 
her employment contract with (he university are subject to the protection 
or section 197 in the event of oUlsourcing. 
41 When intl:rpruHlg s t 97 lhe ConstilutiOlldl (OlHr In NEHAWU v University oj Cape Town 
and Orhers (2001) 2<1 flJ 95 (C\); 2001 (2) BCLR 151 (Cn did so by placing the I.RA 
Wllhln Iht'" context of s 23( I): see par 31_ However, while Mrs X could rely on this provi-
sion 10 justify tht' preservallon or her rights. Ihe utliversity's new serviLe provider might 
argue lhat tile inlposHlon of employee benefits far ill excess of those contemplated in 
Ihe contral t with lhe university would be a Violation of its own right to fdir Idbollr prac-
tices, in addition to other constitutional rights. "I-'airness", it could be sdid, encompasses 
the creation of ernployrnelu rights (in the absence of sldtllwry regulation) through intli-
vIdual agreement or collective bargaining. Rendering an employer subject to unin-
tended liabilitie~ by operation of law may be seen as a pn"malacw infringement of (hiS 
right. The scope tor (he permissible limitalion ot fundarnemal rights is considered below. 
42 jt is Subm1l1ed thai the employer's countervailing dcliru to dn interpretation favouring 
its right to freer/om of economic clctivily (s 22 of the ConStittHion) would be more tenu-
Oil!:.. II would need to be established to wllat extent su(.h freedom is dependenl on or 
affecterl by the specific IrallsaClion in question 
13 Ie, in the sense of not unduly restricting any basic fight guarameed by the Constitution. 
~ince the contrary has not been suggested, the question of Ill!: constitutionality of s [97 
will not bp considered further 
1<1 See s [97(J). Other illlerpretive questions LOll(.ertllhe nature of the rights dfld dUlies 
{hat are subjecr 10 transt"er; in particular, the meaning 01 "all LOntrdcls of elnploYlllent 
111 exiSlcI1U! iruOledia{ely llefore the dale of {ransfcr" (s J 97(2)(a)) and "all the rights 
and obligalions belween tile old employer and an employee at the time of the trallsfer"' 
(s I 97(2)(b)). These queslions are considered below 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRtSES AND THE PROTECTtON OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
But that is not yet the end of the matter. The "limitation clause" of the 
Constitution allows a basic right to be limited or restricted by a "law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity. 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors".~" Mrs X's 
rights in this context and the prima faCie protection provided by seoion 
197. in other words. are not absolute. Section 197 may be interpreted as 
limiting those rights. by excluding the outsourcing transaction. provided 
this falls within the scope permitted by section 36( I). 
Of particular relevance is the primary criterion of reasonableness and 
justifiability "in an open and democratic SOCiety based on human dignity. 
equality and freedom" (above). The parallel European legislation'" and the 
extensive jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in inter-
preting the same fundamental concepts provide a ready framework of 
reference for [he application of this criterion. Grounds for the exclusion of 
an outsourcing transaction from the ambit of the European Directive, it is 
submitted, would argue for its exclusion from the ambit of section 1970"\7 
Even then, however, [he coun would still need to weigh up "all relevant 
factors" in the comext of the specific transaction, including those listed in 
section 36(1). It is not proposed in this article to apply the test with the 
rigour that a court may be expected to do. A brief overview of the listed 
factors, however, helps to indicate the nature of the inquiry involved. 
5.1 The nature of the right 
The rights at issue in the above example are. essentially. Mrs X's retlfe-
ment benefits and the rights to good quality health care and tertiary 
education enjoyed by her children. These are important rights which. if 
removed, would have a serious impact on the Jives, dignity and fULUre 
prospects of all three persons. The nature of the rights should therefore 
argue for an extensive imerpretation of section [97 and against the 
limitation of the rights. 
5.2 The importance of the purpose of the limitation 
The main purpose of a restrictive imerpretation of section [97 in this 
context would be to avoid placing an excessive financial burden on the 
service provider to which the service is being outsourced or, alternatively, 
to make it possible for the university to outsource the service at a lower 
cosl. In an economic climare dominated by global competition, this may 
be Significant in enabling the university optimally to provide tertiary 
education and research. It would, however, require detailed evidence to 
45 S 36( [); sec !lote [7 above wher(; tlie "relevdnt !duor~" LOIH<Jined jn lilt! Sl~( tjO!l dre 
listed 
46 hi p<JrllCul<Jr. J.)jrf~LtjV(' 200 li21EC. see 2 abovt~. 
47 This is 1101 to say thdt exclusion follows dutomatically in such dn event; it olily rnei..l[lS 
that. orr ttl is cOLlnt. S 197 HldY be interpreted as flot prOIf~Ltillg tile SOl i()·f~LOnomic 
rights in question. provided tlw other criteria of:; 36( I) are also met 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
establish to what extent the benefits enjoyed by employees form a barrier 
to cost~effective outsourcing and/or to what extem any economies that are 
reasonably necessary could be achieved by other means (discussed below). 
5.3 The nature and extent of the limitation 
The effect of excluding the transaction from section 197, in the example 
given, would be absolute in the case of the right to teniary education 
enjoyed by Mrs X's daughter, in that she would lose it altogether. Mrs X's 
pension rights would be limited to those offered by the new employer (the 
difference between those rights and her existing rights could be clearly 
quantified), while her son would lose his entitlement to private health care 
and become dependent on state health care. The difference (if any) be-
tween the standards of health care offered by the state and (he private 
sector respectively in relation co his condition could be established on a 
factual basis. 
5.4 The relation between the limitation and its purpose 
The relation between (he limitation and its purpose is a direct one: by 
excluding the transaction from the ambit of section 197, the cost saving 
and flexibility that it seeks to achieve will immediately be achieved. 
5.5 Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
The words "less restrictive" take as their starring point the inroads made 
on em ployees' socio-economic rights by interpreting section 197 as 
excluding outsourcing transactions. The question. in other words, is 
whether equivalent cost savings and flexibility could be achieved if [he 
transaction were held to fall within the ambit of section 197 What is 
intended, it is submitted. is not a case-specific answer'Hi but an ahernative 
imerprer3tion of the section or other legal provisions whereby the same 
purpose could be achieved. A number of such means are conceivable. For 
example: 
• the flexibility built into section 197 itself by permitting the new em-
ployer to offer transferred employees terms and conditions (hat are 
"on the whole not less favourable" than those on which they were pre-
viously employed, but not necessarily identical thereto;'" 
• the possibility of transferring employees to pension. provident or 
retirement funds other than the funds to which they previously be~ 
longed, subject to certain safeguards;" 
48 Eg. acllkvillg econ(Jmies in terms of a busineSS plan within a panlCular bUSiness. which 
Illily well be dependt:rl! on oIlier tr;':HlSil('tions. S 36 is concerrlCd with the interpre[auon 
01 laws 01' general application. which hilS 10 be consistent. "Means" must (hererore rekr 
to II'!JIII rllecHl.'> (ie general rilles or prindples) thaI will tw al Ihe disposal at all parties in 
comparable lases (0 which lhe Silrlle principles could be applied 
49 See s 197(3) (below) 
50 S 197(4). 
96 
R
ep
ro
du
ce
d 
by
 S
ab
in
et
 G
at
ew
ay
 u
nd
er
 li
ce
nc
e 
gr
an
te
d 
by
 th
e 
P
ub
lis
he
r 
(d
at
ed
 2
00
9)
.
• 
• 
THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
the right of the new employer to dismiss employees, including em~ 
ployees transferred in terms of section 197, for a fair reason based on 
its operational requirements;Jl and 
the requirement that the old employer and the new employer must 
enter imo an agreement regulating various maaers, including their re-
spective liability for severance payment due to employees dismissed 
by [he new employer.'" 
Even if an outsourcing transaction is subjeC[ to section 197, in other 
words, results similar to chose achieved by excluding it may arguably be 
achieved Ihrough Ihe applica[ion of al[ernative legal provisions. In [he 
context of our case study, the university would in both cases succeed in 
divesting itself of the service in question, but the cost of doing so would 
be affected, The service provider, even if it is compelled to employ Mrs X 
and her colleagues in terms of section 197, may be able [0 recoup at least 
pan of the cost by relying on the provisions mentioned above, Any in-
roads on employees' entitlements that may result from such alternative 
measures could be considered "less restrictive" than the total exclusion of 
[he pro[ec[ion which Ihey are offered by section 197. 
If results comparable to Ihose achieved by excluding sec[ion 197 can be 
achieved in this manner, it will be a factor in favour of applying the sec-
tion. If such results cannot be achieved, it will be a factor in favour of 
finding the limilation of the employees' rights in terms of section 27-29 
to be permissible and, hence, excluding the transaction from the ambit of 
section 197. 
The above factors, however, must be weighed up cumulatively: no sin-
gle factor is conclusive. 
To sum up: if a transaction is capable of being interpreted as a "trans-
fer" for purposes of section 197, then - all things being equal - this inter-
pretation should be favoured in order to protect any socio-economic rights 
of employees that may be at issue. This places certain constraints on the 
discretion of a court in interpreting section 197, but does not predeter-
mine the outcome of (he inquiry. The court would be called upon [Q apply 
the test laid down in section 36(1) of the Constitution to decide whether 
section 197 may be interpreted as excluding the transanion, thereby 
permitting the restriction of the rights in question. The balance that 
emerges from the application of all relevant factors (outlined above) will 
determine [he decision [hat the cour{ must arrive at. 
HaVing said [hiS, [he s[ar[ing point must be Ihe provisions of section 
197 ilself. Only in applying [hese provisions [0 [he fac[s of a particular 
transaction can it be stablished whether the transaction is capable of 
falling wi[hin [he ambit of the section 
51 Ss 1 Bli dnd 1 WJA, U{A 
52 S 197{7). This does not prevent {he employers from redchlllg agrcc[llt!lIl Oil IUrlher 
rna[{ers lhat Illay faciJildle [he Irdnslf~r IhrolJgh an apportionillent of the altendam (osts 
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LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
6 THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 197 
6.1 "Transfer of a business as a going concern" 
For sen ion 197 10 find application. it has been noted. three faclOrs must 
be present. There must be a "trans]er" of a "busmess or part 0] a business" 
(which may include a "service"). Moreover, the business or service must 
be transferred as a "going concern"" It IS immediately obvious that the 
three facLOrs are closely interrelated. This is hardly surprising. since all 
three fac{Ors refer [Q different aspects of one and [he same transaction. As 
a result it is difficult to separate them and. in practice. the courtS have 
tended [Q look at transactions holistically in order to determine whelher 
all [he requirements of section 197 are satisfied. 
To the extent [hat [he three factors have been considered separately, it 
is settled that "rransfer" is broader than "sale" or change of ownership. In 
Schutte & others v Powerplus Performance (Pty) Ltd & another" the Labour 
Court accepted the approach adopted by the ECj. "The ECJ". it was held. 
has consistently adopted an approach that examines the substance, rather than 
the form, of the rransaccion. Numerous factors have been regarded as indicJ-
tive of a transfer of a business, but no single ractor has been regarded as con-
clusive of thiS determjnalion. For example, a sale of assels may indicate a 
transfer within the meaning of the Directive, but not necessarily. Conversely, 
(he fact lhal no assets were sold does not mean that Lhere has been no transfer 
of a business Likewise, the transfer of a significant number of employees and 
Lhe Immediate continuation or resumption of a service or function is regarded 
as indicative, but not conclUSive, of a transfer within the meaning of Article 1 (I) 
of (he Directive '.'> 
Broad though the notion of "transfer" is. however. it does not include all 
transactions resulting in a de facto change of concrol. One of rhe most 
common forms of transferring control of enterprises is through the pur~ 
chase of a controlling shareholding. In Ndlma & others v Waverley Blankets 
53 S [97(1) For disCllS~iol1, s~{' f~l<tckif: & Horwitz "Trilnst"l:r 01 Contracts of Employment 
as a f\esul( ot Mergers and AcqUIsitions. A Study of Seuioll IY7 of (Iw Labour Hd<1lions 
An 66 or I ql)')" (I qq9) 20 II} 1387; Bosch 'Transfers of contraclS of employrnelll in (ile 
olHsourcing context" (2001) 22 IIJ 840: Bosch "Operational rcquircmc!l(s dismissals 
and seclion 197 of the Labour Iklaliolls Acl: JlrolJJpl1l~ ilnd possillilities" (2002) 23 llJ 
641; Bosch & Mollilmed "Reincarnallng [he Vibrant horse? Tlw 2002 dmendmcllts lO 
Ihe I.I\A and transfers of uIll1enaklllgs" (2002) 1 LDJ) 84, J)u lou "Trallsfer of il busi· 
ness' dlld 'outsourcing': Changes to Europeall LeglslaLion" Labour Law News and CCMA 
Nf'porlS vol II no 6 (Dccelnber 2002). For a general overview see Van JaiJrsveld & Viln 
Eck Principles oj I.abour I.aw 2 ed BUClerworths Durban 2002 pars 533-~37; Grogan 
Workpla('e l.aw 7 ed Juta Cape Town 2003 Ch 14; Du Tal[ et al Labour Rclalions I.ow 
(note 38 above) 427 438. POI' a comprehensive analYSIS of Ihe previous s I ')7. see Smit 
(a/JO/lr l.aw Implications oj the Transjer oj an Undertaking (unpllblished LLD thesis, Rand 
Mrikit;'Hl~ University, October 2(01) 
S4 [19991 2 l\1.LR 16Y (I.e, ;'l( par '35 
55 AI p,lr 3Cl. The rdereJl( e is LO I)irenive 77/187/EEC. sec note 5 above. Tile [ollowlng ECj 
d~cisJ(JIlS dr(' died: Spykas v (jdmwders Benetiik AlIlJalOlr CV 24/85 r I 986J (2) CMLJ-{ 
296; I)r Sophie Re(imon(i Sltchlill!! v HarlO! II 9Y2J IH[J-{ '366; Rrlsk and Christensen v Iss 
Kanlinf'serv/i'e 1149'31 IHLH 1'3'3; Schmidt v Slar~lmti I.pikhkes.w' da Fruheren Amper 
Bordesfwlm [I 'Nol] IHLH 302; Mf:rckx v Ford Motors Co fjel!Jiwn [19961 IR1.R 467 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFfTS 
uet" the Labour Court ruled that this does not amount to a "transfer" of 
the business because it remains in the possession of the same company. 
The employees, in other words, continue to be employed by the same 
employer and there is no occasion to invoke the protection of section 197, 
But a "transfer" only enters the ambit of section 197 if irs subject mat~ 
ter is a "business or part of a business", as defined, and, moreover, if it is 
"a going concern", In itself, the latter term means only that the business is 
"active and operarlng" and may continue if the purchaser so desires57 or, 
as Mlambo J found In NEHAWU v University of Cape Town 0< others (I)," 
"that the shop is being kept open instead of being closed up"" In Maloba 
v Minacu Stone Germistan (Pty) Ltd & anotherbO rhe Labour Court accepted 
that it "conveylsl the fact that the object of the transfer must have been a 
place where people were working before the transfer and will continue lO 
be a place where people ate working after the "ansfer"," 
In Kgethe 0< others v LMK Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd 0< others'" it was found 
that an agreement for the sale of assets does not amount to transfer of a 
business "as a going concern":' Similarly, the Labour Appeal Court in 
NEHA WU v University of Cape Town 0< Others" cited the following ruling of 
the House of Lords with approval: 
It seems to me that the essential distinction between the transt'er ot a busmess, 
or part of a business, and a transFer of physical assets, is that in the Former case 
rhe business is transferred as a gOIng concern, 'so rhar rhe business remains the 
same business but indiFferent hands'. (if I may quote from Lord DennIng MR in 
Lloyd v Brassey 119691 I All ER 382 a[ 384, [19691 2 QB 98 a[ 103 in a passage 
quoted by the industrial tribunal)' whereas In the latter case the asset~ are 
transferred to the new owner to be used in whatever busmess he chooses ' .. 
The Labour Appeal Court in NEHA WU v University of Cape Town 0< Others"" 
considered the meaning of the term more fully, For purposes of income 
(ax, it was noted, a "going concern" includes part of an emerprise "if that 
part is capable of separate operaUon",b7 According to the Departmem of 
Inland Revenue in New Zealand, .. a going concern should be: 
56 [11)1)!}1 6 I3LLK 577 (l.<:)atpnr66 
57 Manning 1/ Metro Ni"san (I <)1)8) 1 <) ILJ I 181 (Le), Wllh reference to General Morors S!1 1/ 
LJesta Auto Componenrl'.1am4aclIlnng 1982 (2) SA 653 (SC). See also Schutfe &: alhers 1/ 
Powaplus Performance (Pty; Ltd & another rl CJCN1 2 BLLH 169 (L(') al par 31 (above) 
58 120001 7 BLLlI 803 ILl ) 
59 At par 33 
60 [2000[ 10 BLLR I 191 (LC) 
61 Thus, in C{lSIl, [he transferred business W<lS 1101 a "going COllu:rn" becCllIse. "whilst It 
remained a corporate entity. rilS1 opcratillg divisiollS had beell closl!d, ils ITIdchinery 
had been cOlTlinerually disposed of. [pcHtl at its premises had been sub· let alld il 
maintained Whe!! ill essence was a skeleton staff of sorne five persons'" iDid aT par 3() 
62 [1997] 10 BLLR 1301 (LC) at 1109 
63 On appeal the Labour Appeal Coun overturned [he tinding as 10 the nature of' the 
agreement 011 Ihe grounds tilat it hdd nOT been proven, but appeared to dccept thaI a 
transfer of assets CJlHlot be equaled 10 transfer of a business as a going concern: Kge1he 
&. others II LMK Manufa('(uring (Ny) Ud &: unO/her [19981 3 BLLR 248 (lAC) <il par 34 
64 [20021 4 BLl.K 3 I J (LAC), 
65 Al par 51, wllh reterellce 10 Melon 1/ Ilector Powe Ltd [198 j J j All Et1. 3 j 3 (IlL) 
66 120021 4 BI.LR 3) liLAC) 
67 5 I I (I )(e) of llie Value· Added rax ACI 89 or j 9') j 
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LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
• able to be carried on by the recipient; 
• accompanied with an express supply of goodwill; 
• a supply of all assets. both tangible and intangible. that are central to 
the business. ,,',0 
However. it "does not necessarily mean that every single asset owned by 
the transferor's enterprise must change hands as a result of the sale of 
that enterprise as a going concern".t~ The court referred with apparent 
approval to two New Zealand decisions in which the meaning of the term 
was considered. In Variely Leisure Corporation v Commissioner oj Inland 
Revenue'l) it was found that the expression "going concern" meant "that 
the particular activity is not closed down on sale but remains active and 
operating before, during and after the transfer to new ownership",7] In 
Kenmir Ltd v Frizzell'" the following explanation was offered: 
In the end, [he vilal conslderation is whether the effeCl of rhe transacrion was 
to pur rhe transferee in possession of a going concern, (he activities of which he 
could carryon without interruption. Many factors may be relevant to this deCi-
sion though few will be conclusive in themselves. Thus if the employer carries 
on bUSiness in the same manner as before, this will point [0 the existence of a 
transfer, bUl the converse is nOl necessanly true, because a lransfer may be 
complete e\'en though the transferee does not choose to avail himself of all lhe 
rights whIch he acquires thereunder. Similarly, an express aSSignment of 
goodwill is strong evidence of a transfer of the business but the absence of such 
an aSSignment is nct condusive If the transferee has efrectlvely deprived him-
self of the power to compete. The absence of an assignment of premises, stock-
In-trade or outstanding contracts will likewise not be conclusive, if the particu-
lar circumstances of the transferee nevertheless enable him to carryon sub-
stantially the same business as before 
In determining whether a transfer satisfies all [he requirements of section 
197. the Labour Court in SchlJlle & others v PowerpLlJs Performance (Ply) Ltd 
& another" followed the test adopted by the ECJ in Spiikers v Gebroeders 
Benedik Aballoir CV:" 
The decisive criterion for establIshing whether there IS a transfer for the pur-
poses for the directive':' is whether the bUSiness in question retains its identity 
Consequently a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business does 
not occur merely because Its assets are disposed of Instead it is necessary to 
6H AI par ,13. rile New Zeal,lnd (;o()ds and SI:rvi{"cs Tax Atl 01 [985 defin(,s lhe Icrm as 
the "slipply oj a taxab[e aUivity between registered persons, where, wlthou( further dC-
lion Ofl ttle part of Iile Iransferee, it is capable ot" uninterrUpled operalions by [he trans-
/"crel'; and rile supply is to form pan or [he taxable 01 Ilvity of the trall~feree": £II par 40 
69 At par <\.1 According W a gUIdeline Issued by (he Soulll Atrican Revenue Service, "tlle 
tcrrll 'going concern' means (hat the cnterprise is sold 'lock, Siock and barrel' and [he 
clHerprise is capable of heing continI/cd wilhout change": citcd ilmi iiI par 42 
70 ([ 9RH) 10 NZTC 5, 255. 
71 Cilcd al flrlr 4:) 
72 1196HJ I All EK 414 (Ill.); cited at par 46. 
73 119991 2 Bl.l.R 169 fl.C). 
74 [l'186J 2 eMU{ 296. 
75 rile ret"preru:e is to (he Acquired Klgills I)ir('ctivc ot lilt: ElJropean (onllllllllily 
(771 [87/F.F.C), adoptcd in 1977, provictmg infer alia for "'the proteCl!on of elllployees in 
Ihe evelll or rl change or employer" 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
conSider whether [he business was disposed of as a going concern, as 
would be indicated, imer alia by the fan that its operallon was actually conlin" 
ued or resumed by the new employer, with the same or similar activities. In 
order to determine whether those conditions are met, it is necessary to con-
sider all the facts characterising the transaction in question, Including the type 
of undertaking or business, whether or not the business's tangible assets, such 
as bUildings and movable property, are transferred, the value of its intangible 
assets at the time of the transfer, whether or not the majority of its employees 
are taken over by the new employer, whether or not its customers are trans-
ferred and the degree of similarity between the activities earned on before and 
after the transfer and the period, if any, for which those activities were sus-
pended. It should be noted, however, that ali those circumstances are merely 
single factors in the overall assessment which must be made and cannot there-
fore be considered in isolation 'I" 
The crucial features of a protected "transfer", the court found, were that 
"the economic entily remained in existence, its operation has been taken 
over by the rirst respondent and the same or similar activity is being 
continued by it".77 
Similarly, the Labour Appeal COUf[ in NEHAWU v University oj Cape 
Town (above) rererred to the ruling by the ECJ in Spijkers v Cebroeders 
Benedik Abattoir (above) as t"ollows: 
[T)he expression 'transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business to 
another employer' envisages the case in which the business in question retainS 
its identity. [n order to establish whether or not such a transfer has taken place 
in a case such as that before the national court, it is necessary to consider 
whether, having regard to all the facts characterising the transaction, the busi-
ness was disposed of as a going concern, as would be indicated inter alia by the 
fact that its operation was actuaIlY.,;ontinued or resumed by the new employer, 
wuh the same or Slmdar activities' 
Would the above-mentioned outsourcing transaction pass this test? Jt 
would seem beyond question that the functions performed by the clean-
ing service of the university form a "service" or "part of a service" which, 
at the same time, forms part of the university'S overall operations or 
"business", It also appears that those functions will continue to be per-
formed up to the time of transfer and will thereafter continue (0 be per-
formed by a new employer. To that extent the cleaning service matches 
the definition of "a going concern". By virtue of the outsourcing transac-
tion itself it may be regarded as an "economic entity", distinct from other 
76 119861 2 CMLR 296: ciled ,-J[ pM 36 
77 At par 51 See also Fourie & another y iscor Ucl [20001 I I BLLR 1264 (1.(') 
78 At pM 49; from par 15 of Ihe SpUkers jlJ(lgmerli. S 197 also applies in Ihe event rhal a 
partnnship is reconstituted. If the employer is a pannership, an employee's conlrau of 
employment IS el1lere(i into wuh Ihe partners jointly and severally. Since a pcHIllership 
is dissolved and a new partnership formed whenever a partner reSigns or a new pdrlner 
join~. a ncw contract of employment is taCitly erHered inlo between tile partners and 
their employees lInder those CirCtllllstanLes. If' so, employees' rigtHs against prevIous 
partnerships, including fights to severance pay based on lenglh of service with the previ-
ous partnershIp, become cnforceable agaillsl the rlew ernployer: see Bllrman Karz AUor-
neys y Brand NO & ollter!, 12001 J 2 BLLR 125 (LC) al par 13, with reference TO Whitaker Y 
Whitaker 1931 EDL 122: Baldinger v Broomlwrg and Howl-' 1919 (3) SA 2:')8 (C) dt 268 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
parts of the university's operation, that will "remain in existence", albeit 
"taken over" by a new party. Its operation will "actually [beJ continued or 
resumed by the new employer, with the same or similar activities". 
In all these respects there appears to be no reason why the outsourcing 
transaction should not be regarded as a protected transfer; although. if the 
argument above is correct.7~ it is enough that it may be regarded as such. 
To the extent that entrenched consritutional rights of Mrs X and other 
employees are contingent on the transfer being defined as a protected 
transfer, it has been argued. this should tip the scales in favour of such an 
interpretation. 
The courts h;we not had occasion to consider this question and have in 
some cases imposed criteria designed to exclude oursourcing rransactions 
from the protection of section 197.~" This approach, and its validity, will 
be considered below. 
6.2 The automatic transfer of employment rights 
The relevant European Oirectives~' have stared ab initio that the transfer of 
employment rights is an automatic result of a protected transfer. Section 
197, in its original form. did not. In Schutte v Powerplus,~2 however, the 
Labour Court interpreted the section (0 mean that transfer of the appli~ 
cants' contracts of employment had taken place auromarically and in 
Foodgro (A division of Leisurenet Ltd) v Keil' the Labour Appeal Court 
described the transfer of contracts of employment in terms of section 197 
as "aUlomatic".~4 In NEHAWU v University oj Cape Town &. others (Ils 
Mlambo J disagreed with the above approach but acknowledged himself 
to be bounn by the ruling in Foodgro v Keil (above). Further support for the 
approach in Schutte v Powerplus (above) was expressed in Western Prov-
ince Workers Association v Ha{gang Properties Cc. d" 
A degree of confusion was introduced by the remarkable decision of the 
Labour Appeal Court in NEHA WU v University of Cape Town 0; Ochers." 
dismissing the view expressed in Foodgro v Keil (above) as an obiter 
dictum and interpreting the former section I 97(2)(a) as follows: 
The concep{ of a transfer of a bUSiness 'as a going concern' implies agreement 
between employers in respec{ of which pans of the business will be trans-
ferred. This will obviously also include agreement on the labour force. There is 
therefore no room for automa(lc non-consensual (ransfer of employees who are 
not intended (Q be pan of [he buslrless (ha[ is (ransferred Employees are as 
79 Sec 10··1 ,1 abovt: 
80 In pdrtiCIJIM, NEHAWlJ v lJniwrslty oj Cape Town & othf'rs (I) [2000] 7 BLLR. 803 (LC); 
discussed below 
81 Sec flOle "3 above 
82 Note 54 dbove 
83 I I 9991 9 BLLR. 875 (LAC) al par 13 
84 ~ef' also FOllrie &. another v Iscar l.td [2000] 11 BIJ.R 1269 (LC) a( par 8.4. 
85 [2000J 7 IlLU1 801 (Le). 
86 !200q6 KLLR693 (LC) iltpars 14-17. 
87 [2002J 4 BLI.R 11 I (LAC) 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
much a parr ot' a business as irs other assets Purchasers and sellers are ;,H 
Ilberty~? detine what IS included In the concept ot a 'going concern', and usu-
ally do 
~orlunately. the confusion was shorllived. In Decembet 2002 the Consti· 
tutional CourrS9 overturned the above ruling by the Labour Appeal Court, 
holding that "upon the transfer of a business as a going concern as con-
templated In section 197( I )(al. workers are transferred to the new 
owner ... ·;" In addition. the amended section 197(2) now provides explicitly 
that, in the event of a protected transfer, 
(a) the new employer IS automatically substitUled in the place ot rhe old em-
ployer in respect ot' all conrracts ot employmenr in existence Immedmtely 
before the date ot' transter; 
(b) all the righLs and obligations between the old employer and an employee at 
the time ot' the Lranst'er continue In t'orce as it rhey had been righLs and ob-
ligations berween the new employer and the employee. 
Mrs X would therefore face no obstacle to the transfer of her employment 
benefits from the university to the new employer on this score. 
6.3 The nature of the rights and duties that are transferred 
as a result of a protected transfer 
The tights and duties that form the subject matter of a protected transfer 
are defined in the most encompassing terms. In addition to contractual 
rights and duties. section 197 states that: 
• "all the rights and obligations between the old employer and an employee 
at the time of the transfer continue in force as if they had been rights 
and obligations between the new employer and the employee"; and 
• "anything done before the transfer by or in relation [0 the old em· 
ployer. Including the dismissal of an employee or the commiSSion of 
an unfair labour practice or act of unfair discrimination, is considered 
to have been done by or in relalion to the new employer"." 
A similar position prevailed in terms of the previous section 197. Thus, in 
Foodgro (A division of Lelsurenet Ltd) v Keit' the L.abour Appeal Court held 
that an employee's period of service with the old employer should be 
taken into account when calculating her claim for severance pay against 
the new employer."' The majority of the courl found that "[tjhe subject 
88 frolTl Eriifor'S Summary at } 12 
H9 1[1 NEflAWIl v Ilnlwrsity of Cape Town (200}) 21 Ilj 95 (CC). 2003 (2) RCLH I :")1 (CO 
90 AI par 71. ThejudglHcnl ("(mliIllH's: 'TllC farllllal1lwr(' Wd<; IlO agn~PtJwm 10 Iran<;fer 
Lhe worklon:(' or pan of it between UC.T and lhe contractors did 110[, as a rn;Htcr of law. 
prevent a finding {fla( [he OUlsolJr(.in~ WdS a [ransl"er of il bu!->incss as a gomg conn·rn. 
Wheth(~r (hc oUlsourcing COlISliLUI(~d tlH~ trdllsfer of orw or more businesses as a going 
concern is a question lhal has yet to be delerlluned.·· 
I)] S ]1)7(2)(b)-IC). 
92 L1999] I) IH.LR. H75 (LAC). 
93 In wrrns of 5 11 of (ile B(tslt" Conditions or ErnployflH·fI[ Au of I Y()7 {replaung 5 19601 
1he I.HAI (tf! t:fTlploy('c wtlO is dbtlllssed for opt:ralional reasons is erllitled (Q scverance 
pily f~qUlvall":{lL 10 one week's relllllileralion per completcd y(~ar 01 st'fvic('. 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
maller of seclion I 97(2)(a) is 'all lhe rights and obligations between the 
old employer and each employee at the time of the transfer' but not 
an employee's 'continuity of employment' The laner is a calculation, a 
fact - nO[ a right or obligation between old employer and employee"." 
Nor being a "right or obligation", it is not subject to variation by agree-
menL"~ Thus, even if the contract of employment is replaced by a new 
comract, length of service and the amount of severance pay to which it 
would emitle an employee in the event of retrenchment are unalterable. Q(, 
Similarly, in Success Panel Beaters & Service Centre CC v NUMSA & an-
other'17 [he Labour Appea! Court held that an order for reinstatement and 
payment of compensation to an employee who had been unfairly dis-
missed by the old employer was enforceable against the new employer." 
There can be no doubt that employment benefits are included within 
the reach of section 197(2) (see above). Most of the benefits that have 
been considered will be contractual rights forming part of an employee's 
"remuneration":~ Any socio-economic benefits nO[ incorporated in the 
contract of employment will be included in the omnibus terms of secrion 
I 97(2)(b) 
Less clear is the extent to which such benefits may be varied. In the 
first place, the transfer of rights and duties may be changed or waived by 
agreement between [he parties. Such agreemem, however, must be 
explicit. In Keil v Foodgro (A division oj Leisurenet Ltd/DO the Labour Court 
also held that rights accruing from length of service will remain in exis-
tence unless expressly waived. The judgment was upheld on appeal. 101 The 
9·1 A( par 22. The judgment ettet:llv(~ly overrides (h,1I of I.andman J ill SACWU v F.n!Jf!n 
Jli!lroit>lIm U(/ & I1norht!r 11999) I P.L.LR 17 (I.e) wlwrp it was hel(1 Ihat. to succeed in a 
claim of Ihis naltJre. (he appllcalion "must show that a riglH to a redundancy benefit. in 
Ille cv<:!I( of lIJ(llr(~ n~dIHldaI1Cles. accrued contracllliilly 10 t~iidl affected employee. II is 
nOl enougtl 10 show [hat il was available by operauon ot" law or tha( it was offered to (he 
union dllti dcccpled" (iit pcH ! 1). 
9S Ar par 25 I( IS submilled Ihal Ihe colin erred in Bllrman Karz Af(orneys v Brand NO Or 
olhr.rs 120011 2 BLLH. J ~5 (LC) by ordering thai only the employee's period or service 
since II Novenl!Jer 199() (when s I <)7 took errect) should he taken into accounr when 
calcula!lng severance pay 
96 II is, however, less clear whether orgamsational rights to which employees were enritled 
hy virille of Iheir trade union memhership are Iransterred IOgether with the bUSiness. In 
Kgerhe &. orlJas v LMK ManujaclIIring (Pry) Ud &. another [J <)<)8] 1 PoLl.1i 248 (LAC) (he 
Labour Appeal COlin declined (0 order thai (he Hade UfHon's organisational rights be 
ill{:orporaled into (he agreernenl for (ransfer of rhe husiness. ·"Those rights eilher eXIst". 
Kroon JA held, "or (hey do not" (at par 53). The implica(ion is thai organisational riglHs 
are existing rights WhlCh do nOI require contraClual regulatJon unle::.s (ile parries wish to 
aller Iheflt. 
97 12000J 6 PoLl.1i 615 (LAC). 
98 At 637. S("e al~o NUFAWU &. Others v Luther NO &. Others [2001]4 I~LLH 44.1 (1.0 at par 1·1 
99 Sec g \ --93 above for discusstOIl of ernployrnem benetits On the medning of "benefits". 
see nole 7 dl)()ve. To lire eXlcrll lIla( lire provision of certain benefits is regulated by 
Slatute (in IJdrticular, ilD (ile Unemployment Insurance Ac( 6.3 of 2001 dwi C:OIDA 63 of 
2001). s ! 97 wilillot be applicdhle in Ih<:lt the new employer will be bound by the stal-
u(e itself, ratlwr than hy ~ 197, (0 assume the oblig<:llions or the previous employer 
100 f I 99g11 ~LL.R 345 (LC). 
101 In /'"oodgro (A diVIsion qj" Lei.'>l]renel Ltd) v Kell (19991 q BI.LR 875 (I.AU 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
amended section [97(6) now clearly lays down the requirements for an 
agreement of this nature. Section I 97(7)(a) also requires a valuation of 
severance pay that would have been due to employees in the event of 
retrenchment by the old employer as at the date of transfer. 
Secondly. it has been noted that the amended section [97 provides For 
the unilateral variation of existing employment rights and benefits in two 
further ways: 
• the new employer may vary the "terms and conditions" of employment 
that are offered to transferred employees, provided they are "on the 
whole nOl less favourable to the employees than those on which they 
were employed by the old employer";'" and 
• the new employer may transfer an employee "(0 a pension, provident, 
retirement or similar fund other than the fund to which the employee 
belonged prior to the transfer", provided certain criteria are satisfied. 10 
In the case of Mrs X, there can be little doubt that the reductions to her 
medical aid, pension and study benefits proposed by the new employer 
go beyond the limits permitted by section 197(3)(a)." By no stretch of the 
imagination can the non-existent or attenuated benefits on offer be re-
garded as "on the whole not less favourable" than her existing benefits. If 
the outsourcing transaction is found to be protected, the new service 
provider would need to improve her benefits (and those of other employ~ 
ees) substantially in order to comply with section 197. 
Less clear is the position in respect of her pension rights, which are 
regulated separately by section 197(4). This provision is considered in more 
detail below. 
6.4 Outsourcing 
Reference has been made to the caution on the part of the courts in 
characterising outsourCing transaclions as protected transfers. The reason 
is not difficult to find. If outsourcing is followed by the automatic transfer 
of the entire workforce and their existing rights, it would seem on the face 
of it to defeat the object of the exercise. On closer inspection, however, 
the issue is more nuanced. The flexibility that is built into section 197, 
discussed above, makes it possible to modify a transaction to accommo~ 
date the concerns of all parties. Even if outsourcing is accompanied by the 
transfer of the existing workforce, in other words, [he new employer may 
seek agreement or take measures - in the last resort, dismissal for opera-
tional reasons - to secure the objectives of the transaction. 
It has, however, been suggested that special criteria should apply in deter-
mining whether or not an outsourcing transaction is subject to section 197. 
102 S 1 97(3)(a). If any terlns dJl(l conditions drV ftWllaled by a (oJleUive agrveJl\t~r\t, 
however, no LJnilateral V<'lrid110tl is pCfrniILed. sec s IlJ7(1)(lll 
I U3 S 197(4) This topiC is diScussed mOfe fully at 24fl" below. 
104 II" any of Mrs X's exislirlg conditions of t~H\ployr\leflt afC n~glll("HCd by colleuivc a!'(ree-
lflcm between twr unioll aWl the univt~rsity. of course. the Sti1tllS of her llend"its would 
be LHldssailable: the tlexibility permitted by s 1 97(1)(a) would (hen be excluded. 
105 
R
ep
ro
du
ce
d 
by
 S
ab
in
et
 G
at
ew
ay
 u
nd
er
 li
ce
nc
e 
gr
an
te
d 
by
 th
e 
P
ub
lis
he
r 
(d
at
ed
 2
00
9)
.
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
"Services" tend to be labour-intensive. In Schutte v Powerplus (above) the 
court referred with apparent approval to Suzen v Zehnacker Gebaudere-
inigungl\;~ in which the ECJ held that "for olltsourcing of services to be 
treated as a transfer of business there must be some concomitant transfer 
of significant assets (tangible or intangible) or the taking over by the new 
employer of a major part of the workforce".~ It IS submitted that thiS 
approach, taken at face value, is problematic. 
In the first place it purports to be in accordance with the test in Sp!ikers 
(above), which calls for all relevant facts to be given due consideration 
and no single fan to be viewed in isolation. Requiring the transfer of 
"significant assets" or "a major part of the workforce" as a sine qua non. it 
is submitted, would be in conflict with Spijkers,'07 Secondly. it creates 
scope for deliberate evasion of the legislation by tailoring a transaclion to 
ensure that it falls beyond the definition of "transfer".'" While a transfer 
of assets or a significant part of the workforce are undoubtedly highly 
significant indicators, it is submiued lhal the lest in SPUkers should be 
reasserted in the contexl of outsourcing. Significantly, the coun in Schutte 
v Powerplus (above) interpreted the SUzen Judgment as requiting "an 
examination of substance and not form; weighing factors that are indica-
tive of a section 197 transfer against those which are not; treating previ-
ous cases as useful indicators, bur not precedent. and in this way deciding 
what is ultimately a question of fact and degree".'" While it is debatable 
whether this accurately reflects lhe reasoning of the ECJ in Suzen, it is 
submitted that it is the preferable approach 
In NEliA WU v University of Cape Town & others (I)'·c Mlambo J adopted 
a different approach. Ruling Lhal the "transfer" of a business is "markedly 
lOS [I ()()71 I Ft.I.K 255; in preference [0 ltw '·hroiHf' i:lpproactJ adopted ill Schmidl v SI(lr-und 
l.eikhkt>sse tier Fmhmm Amper Hordesholm [1944111~LR 302. in which Ihe transfer of a 
service was trealed as tile transfer of pan of a bliSille'is The Siuen c1pproi:lcll was fol-
low('"d In sut)sequent ci:lses: se(~ Hidalgo and others (ECJ judgment daled 10" J 2- J 998. 
case no J 73/96); Hernandez Vidal (ECJ judgment dated J 0- J 2" J 998; case no 127/(6), 
and I~ now embodied in l)ireclive 200l/21EC. See illso Befls v iJrimei HelIcopters Ud 
[19471 IHI.H 1r> I > Oines v Initial Healthmre Services I J 995] ICR I 1 
106 Schutte v Powt'rplus at par 37. 
[07 11 lias also Iwell criticised as a "cornmercial" rather Ihan.3 "labour law" lest: Smit op eic 
130, with reference to B.3rnard EC Employmenr Law 1 ed Oxt"ord 2000 467. 
[08 Eg> by declining [0 employ employees of rhe "old employer" who rnigtll olherWlse have 
been employed. see Be((s v Brinfe1llellcopfers 1!)97 IHLR 361 (CA) and tlie wilrning 
sounded in t:.r.r\-1 v Cox 1999 lRLR 559 (CA). The Coun of Appeal went on 10 hold [hal 
"iHI elliploymelit [ribunal was t:ntitled to have regard as i:l relevant circurnstance to Ihe 
reason why ernployees of [he transferor had flOt be(~ntal{en on by the transferee in de-
ciding whelher or not a Iranster of an undertaking IMd taken place": TransJer oj Under' 
takings (ProtccCion Of Employment) Regulations 1981. Government Proposals Jor Heform. 
Deta/led Background Paper Employrnent Kelations Directorate, Department of Trade and 
Induslry, September 2001 par 25. See also Srnit opeif 133. 
IO() At p<-H 50 See also pars 41-48 for the application of Ihls lest. The Labour Coun is, of 
course, nOI bOllnd by ECJ decisions; any rnisinterprHation of such a decision docs not 
affect Ihe validity ot its jLld~rnent 
110 120()OJ 7 HUH 1-103 (Le). Wliile disilgrecing with Seady AJ in Schulte v Powerplus as [0 
the aUI01I1Jtic nalure ot lhe Iransfer of employmen[ righls following a 'i 197 transkr, 
~11c1ll1bo J did IlOt takt: issue with her irHerpretatlOn of [he test in Slizen. While referring 
[continued on nexr page] 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
different Ifrom] outsourcing",' I the court imposed two further criteria for 
distinguishing a "transfer" for purposes of section 197 from outsourcing. 
First. the transfer must he permanent in contrast to outsourcing where 
"what is transferred is nothing more than the opportunity to perform the 
so-called outsourced services". 12 Second. the outsourcing party must 
relinquish control as well as the power to dictate standards in respect of 
the outsourced services. II} On appeal. the Labour Appeal Court in NE-
liA WU v University oj Cape Town & Others'" made no ruling in this 
regard. The Constitutional Court. as noted above. in effect overruled the 
hard-and-fast distinction drawn by Mlambo J by its finding that 
an outsourcing transaction may amount to the transfer of part of a 
business. II~ 
While Mrs X is thus left in a position of some uncertainty. there are 
grounds for arguing that the transaction in question meets the require-
ments of section [97, even without reference to the protection of consti-
tutional rights. Room for uncertainty arises from the manner in which the 
court may apply the criteria adopted in Spijkers and Schutte (above). The 
Judgment of the Constitutional Court. while establishing that outsourcing 
may amount to a "transfer", does not state in so many words that it must 
be assessed in the same way as any other transaction. Scope therefore 
remains for following the judgment of the ECJ in Siizen (above). or up-
holding the criteria imposed by Mlambo J. on the hasis that these do not 
absolutely exclude the possibility of defining an outsourcing transaction as 
a "transfer" 
In this event, it is submitted, the constitutional factor must be hrought 
into the equation Criteria which unduly restrict the application of sectlon 
[97, thereby allowing the extinction of socio-economic rights, cannot pass 
constitutional muster. Purely commercial interests cannot trump rights 
that are constitutionally entrenched. It The university and/or the new 
employer would need to assert a purpose of equal importance - for 
example. safeguarding the unlversity's ability to give effect to the right to 
education of citizens in general - as a reason for excluding the protection 
of section 197. On the facts outlined above. it is doubtful whether thiS 
could be done 
to [hi::' !Cst With apparent approval. however, lile po~i[i(Jn drrlvcd dl by (Iw ("our! wa::, 
!->ignlficdntly diflf:reru see pars 30 33 or the judgment and tex[ below 
I [! Al pnr 10. 
112 Al par 32. 
1 J3 At pilr 33 
1 14 r200~J 4 BLl.R ") I I (l.AC) 
II:) Nf-."J/A WI! v Unlversity of Capt: Town (2003) 24 IlJ l}~ (lC). 2003 (2) I}CU\ 154 (G.), see 
19 abov(' 
I [(J The fincilrlg 01" Wagli1y J in a d,rt[~rent context (thdl oj" protectlllg (he nglu not to sufier 
unfair cii!->Lrirnin<lllon) i~ apposite: "If protitabllilY is to dictate whether or nOt discrimi-
ndtion i~ Llnf;:w, Il wOllld rwgillt~ ltle very es~ellce for ttle need at· a Bill of Rights" See 
Whitehead v Wuo/worrhs (pry) Ltd [I ()l}l)j 8 BU.H 862 (LC) al par 28. 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
6.5 The dismissal of employees before or after a protected 
transfer 
!-or the sake of completeness, it should be considered to what extent Mrs 
X faces the risk of dismissal in the event that the transaction is found to 
be subject to section 197. In theory, it could happen in one of two ways 
The university might dismiss her prior to transfer at the behest of the new 
service provider because it wants to take on fewer staff; or, if she survives 
the transfer. she may face dismissal by the new employer. 
The LRA seeks to guard against both these possibilities. A dismissal by 
reason of "a transfer, or a reason related to a transfer, contemplated in 
section 197 or J97A" is declared (0 be automatically unfair.117 Although 
the prohibition is cast in extremely wide terms, it may be assumed that it 
is intended to apply only where the transfer is the predominant or proxi~ 
mate reason for the dismissal. 1lH It would not, for example, prevent the 
new employer from dismissing Mrs X for a reason based on its opera~ 
tional requirements following the transfer. While this may appear to 
emasculate the protection offered by section 187( I )(g). it is another way 
of saying that Mrs X will be in no better or worse a position than any of 
the new employer's other employees. Should the new employer resort to 
retrenchments, Mrs X would be subject to the same selection criteria as 
other employees. If seniority is the criterion, 11~ her years of service with 
the university will count as years of service with the new employer. 12o 
Selecting transferred employees for dismissal, on the other hand, would 
be a classic illustration of that which is prohibited by section 187( 1 )(g) 
and, as such, automatically unfair. 
7 PENSION A.ND OTHER RETIREMENT RIGHTS'" 
Asssuming the outsourcing transaction discussed in our example is subject 
to section 197, what happens to the pension rights that Mrs X accumu-
lated during her employment by the university? 
Special provision is made, in (he LRA as in Europe, in respect of the 
transfer of pension rights upon the transfer of a business, The need for 
dOing so is obvious. Pension funds are frequently company funds. making 
it impossible to transfer employees' existing penSion rights to a new 
employer, In addition, pension funds vary conSiderably in the nature and 
value of the benefits they confer. Of particular importance is the distinc-
tion between "defined contribution ,,122 and "defined benefit" schemes. In It 
117 S lH7(l}(g) 
I 18 rf the reaSO[llng of !he coun in SACWU & others v AJi·ox Ltd [1999 J 10 BLLH 1005 (LAC) 
119 Or 'L.Jr(), ClnS! in tlrst OW'). 
120 Foodgro (A division of LeisUrf'nel Ud! v Kpi/ ! 19991 9 BLLR 875 (LAC). 
121 5 197(4) refers to "pension. provident, retirement or similar fundlsJ". !-ior Ihe sake or 
brevity, !hc term "pension fllnds" is used below as rcterring [0 all rhese r'unds. 
122 WhlCil "speCJry lile l"Ofllriburion 10 be paid by the employer and tile employee, but do 
not specify the amount or guarantee tile benefit": Olivier et al op eif I 13 
123 Ie, "ollcr!ingl tilt' retiring lllPJTlber a benefit whictl is dctined according [0 a formula, 
takJrlg llllO accoun! the member'S final salary,. years of menlber.c,llip and a certain 
tactor (known as (he 'accrual' or 'pension' ractor)··· ibid 114 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
may be neither feasible nor reasonable to expect the new employer to 
provide transt'erred employees with rights to retirement benefits eqUiva-
lent to Ihose which [hey enjoyed in their previous employment. On the 
other hand (as the example of Mrs X illustrates), it is vitally important to 
provide employees with the greatest possible protection against erosion of 
their pension rights 
Against this background, legislation in South Africa as well as Europe 
has sought to strike an appropriate balance. Paragraph 4 of European 
Directive 2001/23 provides as follows: 
(a) Unless Member States provide otherwise, paragraphs I and 3 1":'1 shall not 
apply in relation to employees' rights to old-age, invalidity or survivors' 
benefits under supplementary company or intercompany pension 
schemes outside [he statutory social security schemes in Member States 
(b) Even where they do not proVide in accordance with subparagraph (a) that 
paragraphs 1 and 3 apply in relation to such rights, Member States shall 
adopt the measures necessary to protect the Interests of employees and of 
persons no longer employed in the transferor'S busmess at the time of the 
transfer in respect of rights conferring on them irnrnedl3te or prospective 
entitlement to old age benef'its, including survivors' benefits, under sup· 
plementary schemes referred [0 in SUbparagraph (a) 
Section 197(4) of the LM provides that an employee may be transferred 
"to a pension, provident, retirement or similar fund other than the fund to 
which the employee belonged prior to the transfer, if the criteria in sec-
tion 14( I )(c) of the PenSion Funds Act'" ... are satisfied". To thiS, the 
newly-enacted section ISB of the Pension Funds Act has added detailed 
provisions for the apportionment of any actuarial surplus in a pension 
fund'''- While much of the latter falls beyond the scope of the present 
discussion, two of its effects may be noted: 
• Employers are no longer entitled to appropriate the surplus in a pen~ 
sion or provident fund upon the transfer or amalgamation of the fund. 
Though this had already been established by case law,'" section ISB 
now places the question beyond doubt by providing /nler alia for the 
allocation of a portion of the surplus to increasing the benefits pay-
able to members and former members of the fund, I,'': This means that 
U4 Pruvidirlg tur !lw iilJlurlldLic [r(jllstl~r of efllfJ/oYlrlerH rig'IHs iind utJhgJ(lons In (fll~ evc;nt 
of a fJrorc;ucd rr'1I1.,>fl:r 
125 Art 24 of I ()56. S 14( 1 )(c) "requires [he reglsrrar (0 tJe saristicd (1Ia( ally scheme (0 
drnalgatlliilt: or trarr.,>ler fllnds i.e, rC<lsonahl[~ and /;qlJitdble, and au:ords full rf~cogJ\iIIIHl 
to tire righls and rcasonable benefit expcctations of tile persons COllcerrwd in Tcrms 01 
the fLlnd rlllcs, and to additional benefils wtllch have become established prduice" 
(note .'J3a to s 197(1), U\A} 
126 "ActUarial surplus" means, bruadly speaking, the dift'erence between (he [lct value ot (he 
assets in a turrd alld its hdbilities III rt~"'plCCl uf p(~nsiorrable service accrued by rrlt'rnbt'rs 
prior to tile valuation date, St't~ s I, PlCllSill1l Fim(j:-. Act as amended by s I, Ac[ 39 or 2001 
127 Tf'k CorporatIOn Provident Fimd and Others v Lorentz 1999 ('I) SA 881 (SCA); YOlln,ljhlls-
band and others v Decca Contractors (SA) PenslUn Fund and ils Trustees (! 9(9) 20 Il) 
1640 (PPA), uptlcld in New PenSlOn Fund v PensIOn Fund AdjwllCa{or and others (2000) 
21 IL) [447 (C). 
12B For dlscussioll, see Ureltenbach Conrentious Ilnd current issues surrollnainy Ihf' surplus 
legislatIOn (Addrcss to the 2003 Corllcwllce of the Pcn",ion Lawyers' Association) csp 
pars 6 15 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Mrs X will benefit from any surplus that may have accumulated in the 
university's pension fund during her period of service; and 
• Mrs X and other transferred employees would not be entitled to share 
in any existing surplus in the pension fund to which they have been 
transferred. ",' 
It furthermore "ppears that Mrs X will be entitled to any specific benefits 
which, in terms of the rules of the university's pension fund, may fall due 
upon termination of her employment by the university, In Telkom and 
others v 810m and others'" the Supreme Court of Appeal found, in the 
context of a protected transfer, that the affeCled employees nevertheless 
remained entitled to certain benefits that were due (0 (hem upon (ermina~ 
tion of their employment by the old employer." This was, however, a 
consequence of a particular comraclUal provision which defjned "(ermina~ 
tion" as including the transfer of employment contracts to a new em-
ployer. It therefore does not establish any general principle, except to 
suggest that the old employer may remain liable towards transferred 
employees for obligations which, by their nature, are incapable of being 
transferred to (he new employer.' ~., 
However. what does happen to Mrs X's existing penSion rights upon 
transfer in terms of section 197 is less clear.'" Section [97(4) does no 
more than permit her transfer to a different pension fund that meets 
cenain minimum requirements. It does not state that her accumulated 
rights benefits vis~iz~vis the existing pension fund;~4 must be transferred to 
the new employer's pension fund. It does not, indeed, state explicitly that 
the new employer is obliged to create a pension fund if none exists. While 
J 29 ~ct"ilerlbd.·11 op CIt JJars 301t. 
130 C1S(~ no 227/02 (SCAl '30 May 2003 (ul\reported). Sec also Ihe judgment of the High 
Coun, reponed as Blom and Others v Tp/kom SA l.Id ami Others 12002] 5 BPLK 3395 (D. 
131 That is, "'if the services of [an afteCied employeej are lermirl'lled by the employer il.S d 
re~ull of .he abolition of his post or <l reorganisation of the employer's aClivilies', certaIn 
speutkd pellsion and grallilly benefits 'shall be paId to Ihe member'" Te/kom v Blom 
(a hove) ,l[ par 12. 
112 rhis proposition is. however, open to qucslion. Otllhc race of ir, if rhe new employer is 
suhs([[uled for the old employer in respect of all rights and obligations, [ile new ell!-
ployer could Iw held liaille for [he value of any "p(~nsion and gratuity bencflls" Ihat are 
due by tile old f'mployer, except to (he eXlent lilal s 197(4) allows for variation and/or 
the matter is regulated Ily il.grecmellt between the parties in terms of s 197(6). The 
question was not pursued in Te/kom v Blom. 
133 S 197(,1) "does not adequately address the Irallster or pension rights simultaneously 
witl] the trallstf'r ot employment contracts where employees are nol by agreement 
piirty to Ihe trallsfer'" Te/kom v Blum (il.bovd at pdf 18. See also OliVier et al at 146 147, 
wtlere some of tile variations in the provision of retirement benei"ils that rrlil.y occur as a 
consequence of transter from one relirement fund to another are considered. A reduc-
tiOll in tilt: vallie of a promiscd retirement benefil without the consenl ot the allected 
employees, It IS argued, "effectively amounts 10 a unilateral change in terms and condi-
tions of employment" and may also amount 10 an unfair labour practice in terms of s 
J 8b(2)(d) of tile LJ'I.A (at 147). The laller ~uggeslion is douhtful: rights to retirement 
benefils have consistently been held to form ran of "remuneration" and, as such, ex-
clLJd(~d fr01l1 tlie protcction of "benefits" ito s [86(2)(a): see note 7 above. 
I '3-1 Which may be ussumed to be a separate legal person from Ihe (~rrrployer: cf Te/kum v 
Hfom (above) al par 16 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Ihis may be inferred from the general Iransfer of righls and obligations. it 
leaves considerable scope ror uncertainty. While failure to provide compa-
rable pension rights may amount to constructive dismissal,135 it does not 
follow that such dismissal will be unfair. If the new employer's offer of 
"substantially less favourable" conditions was dictated by bona fide opera-
tional requirements. Mrs X and her colleagues may be left wilhoul a remedy. 
The same would apply in respect of medical aid benefits and other con-
tractual rights. such as a thirteenth cheque The implications of these 
uncertaimies are considered in conclusion. I~" 
8 CONCLUSION 
It will be assumed (even though. as noted above. the law is not clear and 
the decision of the Labour Court in Nehawu v University oj Cape Town l37 
does not support the assumption) that the transaction described above 
must be interpreted as falling within the scope of section 197. What 
would be the effects? 
The first effect is that the new service provider will have to take on Mrs 
X and her colleagues on terms that are "on the whole not less favourable" 
than those offered by the university.'" This implies that any significant 
reduction in respect of one component - for example, medical aid bene-
fits - should be compensated for by another component - for example. 
remuneration. It remains to be seen how the courts interpret the provision. 
In the case of pension rights, the pOSition is less clear. While subject to 
the same general rule (above). it is expressly provided that Mrs X may be 
transferred to a different pension fund.'" Should the benefits provided by 
the new fund be substantially inferior. the shortfall would presumably 
have to be compensated. most probably by additional remuneration in an 
amount sufficient to place Mrs X in the same position upon retirement 
that she would have been in had her employment at the university run its 
course. 
At this point it should be obvious that the transaction may be making 
progressively less sense from the service provider's point of view. The 
latter, presumably, will have entered into negotiations With the university 
on the basis of its existing wage structure. The outcome, however, may be 
to impose wage costs significantly in excess of its original estimate. Leav-
ing aside the propriety of business tenders premised on low wages and 
I"3S s I 86(t) defincs it as "(jislllissaJ" it" "an enlploycc (crrnifli:iled d CUfllrdct of cmpluyltlCll1 
with or without notice beCilUS{: the rww f""!trlployer. altef a tralls!t~r ill terms of section 
197 or serilOn J97A, provl(ied ttle employee with conditions or Clrcumstances at work 
that arc SUbsldlllJally less favourable to the errlploycc [hall tllllSC provided by the old 
employer" 
I '36 Sec 86 above 
J 17 [2000j 7 BLLR 803 (LC), ret"errcd back 10 the Labour Appedl Court by lhc COIlstitutiulldl 
COUrI 
['3H S 197(3): dJs('IJs5>t:(i at I ()6 197 above 
1 VJ Ibid 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
few benefits, the service provider may be expected to increase its price to 
compensate for the added cost. This, in turn, may reduce the savings 
which the university was hoping to eFFecl. Withdrawing From the transac-
tion. assuming that were possible, would not be the answer either. Any 
other service provider with which the university may seek to do business 
would be in precisely the same position. 
One possible outcome. on these Facts. is that the university may Find It 
impossible to outsource its cleaning service. To effect savings, one option 
would be to take on the employees and their union in an attempt to 
reduce wages_ Even if successful, this may well be at the cost of industrial 
aclion with the attendant legacy of disruption and potential for future 
conFlict Alternatively. dismissals For operational reasons - possibly in 
other departments, including academic departments - would be a likely 
response. In either event the core business of the university - teaching 
and research - will suffer to a greater or lesser extent. 
The other possible outcome, on the same facts, is that the transaction 
may be challenged ex POSI faCIO. thus conFronting the service provider 
with a wage explosion, with increased remuneration to the former univer-
sity employees payable retrospectively to the date of transfer and its other 
employees undoubtedly expecting equal treatment. Assuming it is possi-
ble to avoid insolvency and stave off industrial action, retrenchments and 
possible cancellation of contracts would be distinct possibilities. 
All this is a far cry from the conception of section 197 as an instrument 
for serving the interests of workers as well as employers in a context of 
economic growth. 14::: Undoubtedly, strong arguments could be addressed 
to a court in support of the contention that section 197 should not be 
applicable to outsourcing transactions unless in exceptional circum-
stances. It is submitted, however, that the answer lies not in excluding 
section I <)7 but In applying it in accordance with the purposes of the LRA. 
Of particular importance is the purpose of promoting collective bargain-
ing.- 4 . In the context of section I <)7 this finds application in the provision 
for variation of the consequences of the transfer by written agreement 
between the parties. designed specifically to address problems of the kind 
outlined above. 142 
On the given facts, such an agreement would need to be reached bet-
ween one or both employers on the one hand and Mrs X"S union on the 
other.' " Achieving it might not be easy. All parties would be faced with the 
prospect of substantial loss - the workers in terms of remuneration, the 
university in terms of its strategiC plan, the service provider in terms of 
profit and loss. In the scheme of the LRA. however. collective bargaining 
is the essential means of seeking a balance between competing interests. 
140 St:c In -9,\ above 
141 Sees I(Ll and (el) 
142 S 197(2) read wl[h 5 147(6) 
111 S 1'}7(6) reild Willi s IH9(1} Tlw union, rather Ihan tile employee!>. must represenltlle 
employtes irrespective of whe(Iler i( has a lJargilinilig relaLi()n~hip with [he universilY 
~t-:c ~ 1 H9( t )(Il)(ii) 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
I n the above situation the aim would be to find an acceptable compromise 
between the cost of the status quo and that of the arrangement which the 
university and the service provider iniLially contemplated. 
To assist the process, both employers would have to disclose to the un-
ion "all relevant information that will allow it to engage effectively in the 
negotiations". 1~4 It may be expected thal the union, drawing on its experi~ 
ence in other situations, would bring suggestions to the table for averting 
the harshest consequences for its members. By its presence, it might also 
induce the university to seek expen advice it might otherwise not have 
sought. In the process, more creative expedients may be arrived at than 
either might initially have imagined. 
II agreement is reached it would, most probably, involve concessions by 
all parties. Mrs X might hope to retain certain benefits - for example, the 
university might concede the continuation of reduced tuition fees for the 
transferred employees and their children. The service provider might be 
persuaded to offer improved medical aid facilities to all its employees. In 
return, the union might agree to a productivity arrangement - For exam~ 
pie. making wage increases dependenl on increased performance. Though 
all parties rrllght ritually criticise (he outcome. it would be the best that 
any of them could hope for in the absence of industrial conflict or court 
anion, the result of which would be both costly and uncenain. 
It may thus be concluded (hat section 197 may indeed offer protection 
to the socia-economic rights enjoyed by employees who are subject to an 
outsourcing transaction. The nature and extent of the protection, how-
ever, need not be Idr to a court to determine. It is open to the parties LO 
do so themselves. 
Time, however, will be of the essence The scenario sketched above 
shows how important it is for employers, as well as unions, to be well and 
timeously advised in the run-up to an outsourcing nansaction. In a polar-
ised relationship, jf there is one option worse than the avoidance of 
section 197, it could be its mechanical application unmediated by collec-
rive bargaining. 
APPENDIX: 
OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES'" 
Botswana 
The relevant legislaLion in BOlswana is concerned in the first place with 
protecting employees' continuity of service in the event of transfer to a 
new employer, rather than with prOlecting terms and conditions of em~ 
ployment. Section 29( I) of the Employment Act of 1982 (Chapter 47:0 I) 
provides as follows: 
144 S j 97(6)(b) 
145 RC;::i{'Circh was t:om!tlued in respect of j1olSWdfld. I.csortlO. NrllTlIbw, Swaziland, Zalnbia 
dnd ZiJT1b"bwe. III rcspen of Mozambique 110 malerials could be located in drty acceSSI-
bl(; library Of deurOlll( database 
113 
R
ep
ro
du
ce
d 
by
 S
ab
in
et
 G
at
ew
ay
 u
nd
er
 li
ce
nc
e 
gr
an
te
d 
by
 th
e 
P
ub
lis
he
r 
(d
at
ed
 2
00
9)
.
LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
If a (rade, undertaking, business or enterprise (whether or not it is established 
by or under any written law) is transferred from one person to another and an 
employee ... continues to be employed therein, the period of continuous em-
ployment immediately preceding the transfer shall be deemed ... to be part of 
the employee's contmuous employment with the transferee immedIately fol-
lowing the transfer 
Section 29(2) makes a similar provision where one body corporate is 
substituted for another as employer and section 29(3) where an employer 
dies and employment is continued under the legal personal representa-
tives or trustees of the deceased. Finally. section 29(4) provides that if 
there is a change in the partners. legal personal representatives or trustees 
who employ any person. the employee "shall be deemed to remain in 
employment with the same employer and such change shall be deemed . 
. . not to interrupt such employment", 
The protection thus provided leaves the common law essentially undis-
turbed. ,;. The contract of employment and other rights and obligations are 
not transferred automatically. The old employer will terminate all con-
tracts and the new employer is free to re-employ the employees or not 
employ them. In terms of section 27 an employee may protest against 
termination to the labour officer within 14 days. In terms of section 28 
the employee is entitled to severance pay if the employment is terminated 
for any reason unless the employee's service with the employer was less 
(han 60 months, or if he/she was dismissed for serious misconduct, or if 
helshe is entitled to the payment of a gratUity orland pension. 
It furthermore appears that the Act only applies to the transfer of a 
whole business and not to part of a business. The Act only protects those 
employees who were employed by the old employer at the time of the 
transfer ann are re-employed immedia(ely by the transferee. In that case 
the section provides continuous employment (previous employment is 
reckoned as employment with the transferee which might be relevant in 
connection with penSion, promotion, severance pay (as a five year service 
award in terms of section 28 of the Act) or period of notice for dismissal). 
"transferred" 
The section simply uses the term "lransferred". It appears to include, 
therefore, any transfer. including a merger and, provided an entire 
"trade" or "undertaking" is outsourced, pOSSibly outsourcing as well. It is 
likely. however. that South African case law will be persuasive. 
Lesotho 
Relevant legislation in Lesotho is confined [() "contracts of foreign serv-
ice" Section 163 of the L.abour Code Order 24 of 1992 provides that a 
146 In P<tfl IV of [Il(; Au, dedllng willi spt'ci<tl contracts in relation to recrtJ!unem, S 49 
pr()vidt~S that [he (ransfer of any COnlr,w[. of emploYlTlcn[ from one employer 10 another 
··shall be slIhjeCl [() [he cOllsent ot the employee and (he endorsemem of the (rctn~fer 
upon [he contract by a t,1bour officer" 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
contract of employment may be transferred to a new employer if the (old) 
employer and the employee "mutually agree" thereto and if a labour 
representative or attesting officer authorises the transfer. 
No provision is made in regard to the transfer of a business as a going 
concern and it must be assumed that in this event the common law rule 
will apply. Contracts of employment will be terminated by the old em-
ployer and the new employer will be free to re-employ the employees on 
new terms and conditions of employment. The new employer will not be 
liable for claims that arise out of the prior employment relationship. 
The employee's sole entitlement will be to severance pay in terms of 
section 79 unless he/she has been dismissed for misconduct. Severance 
pay is due to em ployees who have completed more than one year of 
continuous service "with the same employer" and is eqUivalent to two 
weeks' wages for each completed year of service. 
Namibia 
The Labour Act 6 of 1992 preserves the em ployer's common law right to 
dismiss employees upon transfer of a business and explicitly provides that 
such dismissal shall be treated as retrenchment. 
Section 50 of the Act provides for the collective termination of contracts 
of employment "on account of the re-organization or transfer of the 
business" on the same basis as for other operational reasons. The old 
employer may terminate any or all of the contracts but must inform any 
recognised trade union (or, if such a trade union does not exist, the work-
place union representative) as well as [he Labour Commissioner of the 
facts set out in section 50( I). In the case of the union or workplace union 
representative such information must be provided at least four weeks 
before termination. 
Thereafter [he union, workplace union representative or employees 
must be allowed an opportunity to negotiate abut the conditions of termi-
nation. In terms of section 52 the employer is further required to pay 
severance pay (0 all employees who have completed at least twelve 
months of employment unless their dismissal (Ook place for reasons of 
misconduct or "incapability" or if any of the further conditions set out in 
section 52(2) are present 
It follows that the new employer may re-employ the dismissed employ-
ees on new terms and conditions of employment. 
Swaziland 
Neither the Employment Act 5 of 1980 nor the Industrial Relations Act I 
of 1996 contains provisions relevant to the transfer of an enterprise as a 
going concern. In terms of section 35 of the Employment Act employees 
are entitled to severance pay upon termination of their services unless 
(ermination is for a fair reason in terms of secrion 36. One such fair 
reason is "because the employee is redundant". 147 It is unclear wherher 
147 S 361JI 
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LAW. DEMOCRACY I'< DEVELOPMENT 
em ployees dismissed prior to the transfer of a business can be considered 
"redundant" under certain circumstances. If so, it would disentitle them 
from receiving severance pay. 
Zambia 
The Industrial and Labour Re[ations Act 27 of [993 and the Industrial and 
Labour Re[ations (Amendment) Act 30 of 1997 contain no provisions 
relevant to the transfer of a business as a going concern. The Employment 
(Specia[ Provisions) Act 29 of 1975 is applicab[e only during a state of 
emergency. 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is the only Southern African country outside South Africa to 
have enacted legislation providing for the transfer of contracts of em· 
ployment upon transfer of a business. These provisions precede the South 
African LRA by a good many years. 
A number of regulations relevant to the transfer of a business as a going 
concern were contained in the Transport Operating Industry Employment 
Regulations. 1961.'" applicable to a[1 employers and employees in the 
transport operating industry in what was then Southern Rhodesia. 
Regulation 19(1) states that "Iclontinuous service shall only be deemed 
to be broken by the death. resignation. retirement or discharge of the 
employee concerned". Regu[ation [9(2) adds that continuous service is 
deemed not to be broken if an employee is dismissed and re-employed 
within two months in certain circumstances. Regulation 19(4) specifically 
provides as follows: 
If upon the change of ownerShip of the establIshment an employee enters the 
service of the new owner or continues his employment in the establishment, 
his service with the previous owner shall be reckoned as service with the new 
owner and shall be deemed not to have been broken by such change of 
employer 
While the purpose of the regulalion was to protect employees who were 
dismissed due to the sale of a business but were re-emp[oyed by the new 
employer by preserving their continuity of service. their contracts of 
employment were not transferred automatically. In Attorney General of 
Southern Rhodesia v Thornton's Transportation Rhodesia (Private) Ltd'" it 
was held that the intention of the regulations "was that continuous service 
rendered before the regulations came into force must take into account to 
delermine an employee's minimum rate of pay from then on It was 
never intended that on the coming into force of the regulations each 
employee would be deemed to have started work on that date and his 
minimum rate determined on that basis". 150 
1 ·18 (iovtrnmtllt Notice No 4080t 1 <)6 1 
14':1 (1%4) H.I.H, 150 
150ilIJ:)2(,. 
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THE TRANSFER OF ENTERPRISES AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
The Labour Relations Act 16 of 19841~1 now provides for the automatic 
transfer of the reciprocal rights between employer and employee from the 
old employer to the new employer in the event of the transfer of a busi-
ness, including length of service. The relevant part of section 16( I) reads 
as follows 
[WJhenever any undertaking is alienated or transferred in any way whatso-
ever, the employment of [persons employed thereJ shall, unless otherwise law-
fully terminated, be deemed to be transferred to the transferee of the 
undertaking on terms and conditions which are not less favourable than those 
which applied irnrnediately before the rransfer, and rhe continuity of employ-
ment of such employees shall be deemed not (Q have been interrupred. 
"undertaking" 
Although section 16( I) makes no mention of "going concern", Gubbay CJ 
in Mutare Rural District Council v Chikwena'"'C interpreted the Lerm "under-
taking" to mean "a separate and viable business". Rderence was also 
made to the "somewhat similar provision" contained in section 197 of the 
South African LRA and rulings of the South African Labour courr" on the 
meaning of the phrase "as a going concern" were described as "apposite". 
The meanmg of "undertaking" may thus be taken to be same as "a going 
concern". 
"the employment" 
All rights and obligations between the old employer and the employee are 
included in [he transfer, whether comrac[ual or otherwise. No dis(inction 
is drawn between transfers in general and transfers under circumstances 
of insolvency. The effect is that all rights and obligations will be trans-
ferred to the new employer even in the event of the old employer's 
winding up or sequestration.'~·' 
Subsection 2(c) provides that the tights that the employees had against 
the old employer "immediately before the transfer" may be enforced either 
against the new employer or against both the old and new employers. 
In terms of subsection (2)(b) the employees may agree to conditions of 
employment which are less favourable than those which applied "imme-
diately before the transfer". Rights to social security. pensions, gra[Uities 
or other retirement bendits, however, may only be reduced with prior 
written authority of the Minister of Labour. 
151 eh 28.01, as amended by the L.dbour Relallons AmcndlllCIl[ A,{"I 20 or IYY1 
152 2000 (I) ZIJ{ '114 (SO ar 517E, with rdcrcm;c to an Australian case Fop oj the Cross 
(Pty) Ltd v Federal Commissioner q/ Taxation (1980) 50 FLR 19 
151 In Manning v Metro Niss(w (11.)98) 19 ILJ I 181 (IF) iii I 189, Schutte 6i ()ther,~ v f'ower-
/)/Il.s PerJorm(1nce (Pty) Lrd & Another (1999) 20 ILJ 6:'>5 at 664 
IS4 Ie, in contrast (0 ttle POsi[lon III terms ot· s IY7A(2}(b) ot" tile South Afrtcan LRA (as 
amende(j). The reason. apparently, is thar many clTlploycrs sold Iheir cOrTlpilni(~s dlJ[~ 10 
(he change of goV(;mITlenr jll 1980 iilld lefl Ihe (ountry without payirlg retrencllmen( 
benefits to employees: Blilckie &. Horwitz 'Transfer of COrllracrs ot Employment as a 
result 01" Mergers am1 Acquisitions: A Study ot Sen ion 197 01" thc 1..<lI)Qur Relations Act 
66 ot 1495" (1999) 20 II) 1387 at 1105 
II? 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
"unless otherwise lawfully tenninated" 
Scction 16( I) docs not prevent the dismissal of employees prior to trans-
fer of the business for any lawful reason other than the transfer itself. In 
Mutare Rural District Council v Chikwena'~" it was furthermore held that "all 
or some of the employees [mayJ be excluded by agreement'" From the 
alienation or the transfer of the undertaking to the new employer. The 
phrase 'deemed to be transferred' makes this c1ear".,c.7 If this is so, it 
would greatly reduce the prOlecLion of employees, in that employees 
excluded from the transfer may well face retrenchment by the old em~ 
ployer and would thus be left with no right except to severance pay and 
other outstanding remuneration and/or benefits. I~ 
Any violation or evasion of section 16, actual or atLempted, is declared 
an unfdir labour practice in terms of section 16(3). It is unclear whether 
an agreement between the old employer and new employer to exclude 
employees from the transfer without a rca son consistent with the purposes 
of the section would be seen as an attempt at evading its requirements, 
155 20()() (1) ZI.R !'i34 (SO, 
156 Ie, between rile old employer and lhe new employer 
157 AI :'l3H [) F. 
158Stes13, 
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